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Ansvar väger tyngre än frihet - Responsibility trumps liberty

8 nov. 2020

The claim of social psychology


A while ago, Paul Bloom wrote on Twitter:

The main claim of pre-2012 social psychology is that small changes in the environment can have big effects on thought and behavior. If true, this has important theoretical and practical implications. It's probably not true.

I am trying to write an introduction to social psychology (and more) for high-school students, and I really need to address this statement. My immediate response is: "Of course it's true". Replication crisis, methodological and even metaphysical doubts notwithstanding, is it really controversial to claim that, of course, we humans are affected by environmental stimuli, often subconsciously, all the time?

(I also need to deal with the ideological overtones of this debate, while keeping things fair and balanced.)

What to do? Why not reach out on Twitter?

As expected, Professor Bloom graciously responded almost immediately:
Sure. But just so I can be clear about what we're disagreeing about, can you give an example of where you think I'm wrong - of a social psych finding showing that "small changes in the environment can have big effects on thought and behavior"?
Here are my spontaneous reactions to that challenge. Let me start by setting the scene. Below is a snippet I wrote some years ago:

I don't think it is at all obvious to discuss the climate crisis as a (solely or largely) ethical or moral dilemma. And it's not clear to me that it should be considered an especially hard problem, either. There are many practical problems, to be sure; but they are just that: practicalities. 

"The perfect moral storm" is a grievous misnomer. It seems to imply that there are major obstacles to agreeing (in principle) on what should be done when, in fact, it refers to a confluence of  aggravating circumstances when it comes to acting accordingly.

The tragedy of the commons isn't an ethical problem, but rather a practical one. Sure, there are ethical considerations regarding how we, as a society, should calculate and weigh different interests and risks. But, again, "moral competence" appears to denote only the ability or desire to act consistent with any reasonable calculus. 

I believe that a failure to distinguish between what should (or could) be done, and what people seem willing (or eager) to do, is highly counter-productive. It leads to "moral hazard"; in effect providing people with a perfect alibi for doing nothing; for not acting constructively, and in accordance with everything they actually know - or are told - to be right (and absolutely necessary).

Perhaps this seems circuitous, but one of the messages I wish to bring across to my students is that we humans have a strong tendency - for better or worse - to adapt to our (social) circumstances. That adaption often follows a simple (subconscious) rule: "I'd rather be wrong than alone". We pick up cues in our environment and - courtesy of both evolutionary heuristics and neural plasticity - build chains of inferences according to something like the following sequence:

Occurrence -> Frequency -> Normalcy -> Permissibility -> Correctness -> Morality

We need to fit in, above else. This means being no more far-sighted, logical, consistent, balanced, fair, neutral, or broad-minded than necessary - and not at all if that would mean stigma or exclusion. Our shame-avoidance and status-seeking behavior overrides any cognitive dissonance and dampens any incentive - however weak - to question the status-quo. What is virtuous and who or what is authoritative is highly contingent.

(Then, of course, there are also reasons at the individual level for being less than a saint.)

More to the point, a more general formulation of the overall finding (and claim) of social psychology - as I have understood it - is that people act and think differently depending on where they are - not who they are. If the claim of cognitive science is that, basically, people are people, then (in the words of Depeche Mode) why should it be that you and I should get along so awfully?

There are countless examples of local and regional variations in habits, customs, norms, regulations, laws, etc. that generate and perpetuate drastic differences in how individuals perceive the (social) world. Just to take one example: In one relatively small province of Sweden, the percentage of people who support an ultra-nationalistic party is much higher than anywhere else in the country. There is no reason to think that regional differences could explain this (as there are hardly any in Sweden) other than the fact that a prominent party member happens to live there. These kinds of contingencies crop up everywhere.

On a much broader scale, the World Values Survey shows just how much practical and ideological differences actually hinge on contingencies.

The Overton window changes from place to place and from time to time, and with it, how individuals talk, think and feel.

Marketing, both in the long and short term, drastically influences peoples' ideas of what is valuable.

In the short term, anchoring effects can have huge impacts

The whole concept of nudging is based on changing the "choice architecture" and so changing individual choices (without limiting or forcing them)

Social facilitation affects individual performances in group settings versus in isolation.

Social movements change individuals' attention and values.

The Hawthorne effect is ever present, and keeps bolstering many spurious claims about the effectiveness of various interventions (keeping e.g. educational consultants busy).

Group-attribution creates and increases polarization, even on essentially meaningless issues. There are Robber's caves and Minimal groups everywhere, with diverging world-views as a result.

Social media corrodes what cohesion and societal osmosis we have managed thus far. Neal Stephenson depicts this magnificently in his book "Fall, or: Dodge in Hell" where a part of Utah is still cordoned off, even decades after a hoax about a nuclear explosion that "truthers" still (wish to) believe actually happened. 

Behavioral genetics seems to show that, apart from genes, one's peer-group seems to be the strongest influence on how one's personality traits develop and which trajectory one's life takes.

School rules massively influence what students perceive as "normal", right or wrong etc.

Despite intense critique leveled at Asch's and Millgram's conformity experiments and other classics of social psychology, there is clearly much folk-wisdom contained in them.

In the same vein, priming is clearly a thing - regardless of how many botched and over-hyped experiments are exposed. How could it not be? Our minds are associative networks and most, if not all, of the activity of mind takes place without conscious awareness or control.


Ramblings, to be sure, and not a very succinct answer to Professor Bloom's question. Much hinges on what we mean with "a small change" and "a big effect", and any single experiment might not be able to able to demonstrate this with a sufficient degree of scientific credibility or to allay all ideological wishes and misgivings.

What I want, most of all, is guidance on how to talk about these topics with young people - students for which I am partly responsible - in a way that is bold and progressive while at the same time scientifically and philosophically "kosher". It's a fine balance: As soon as I take liberties with the extremely cautious school curriculum I risk civil disobedience. On the other hand, as soon as I lecture on a new experiment or theory it doesn't take long before that same experiment is dissected, rejected and frowned upon by parts of the scientific and intellectual community.

I suspect that there is sometimes an overblown fear of association with social psychology in general, and with ideologically fraught findings specifically - so much so that even level-headed academics jump on the bandwagon of suspicion or acquiescence just to steer clear of any controversy. (Which, in itself, is a powerful demonstration of social psychology at work.)


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Professor Bloom:

It's an interesting discussion, but I think we're talking past each other. Our moods and thoughts are plainly influenced by our environments—by Trump and Covid, sunny days and sweet music, etc. We knew this long before the first social psychologist ever walked the earth. My skepticism is about the idea--defended by many people I respect--that subtle cues have big effects that we are unaware of (e.g., the sight of a flag makes you more conservative). For the bigger-than-a-tweet version of my argument: The War on Reason (The Atlantic,  March 2014)

Me:

Would you agree that what bridges the gap between us is: 1) that I include cumulative and divergent effects in the ”big effects” category; and 2) that I worry more about instances where intelligence, self-control and intellectual humility are in short supply?

Professor Bloom:

Sure. We might just be focusing on different things. But, still, I don't see any reason to qualify the claim that I made in my original tweet: The radical claim that small environmental influences have big effects is probably not true.

19 aug. 2020

Guest post by Hannes Bengtsson: Four philosophical questions

My sixteen year-old son, Hannes, has taken his first course in philosophy during the summer holidays. During this time he has written four short essays on classic philosophical questions. I am very happy to follow his progress and I am proud to present his essays below.


1. Hedonism and the experience machine

The experience machine

The experience machine argument is a thought experiment that serves as an argument against the hedonistic theory of well-being. In the experiment you are faced with a decision: to plug yourself into the so - called “experience machine” or to continue with your daily life.

The experience machine is a machine that, once you’re plugged in to it, will make you experience nothing but uninterrupted high-quality [1] pleasures during your whole life. The pleasures will be suited to your preferences and might be e.g : proving mathematical theorems, saving the world and having wonderful relationships. All your biological needs will always be satisfied and you will be completely solo with no means of interacting with the outside world.

According to the hedonistic theory of well-being the only thing that one’s well-being turns on is the total balance of pleasure (contributing positively to one’s well-being) over pain (contributing negatively to one’s well-being) in your life. Pleasure makes one’s life go better, pain worse. So, the best thing according to this theory would be to plug yourself into the machine. But most likely you wouldn’t want to do it. Why is that? There’s something else than pleasure and pain that matters in one’s life. We want to have authentic experiences, not artificial.

The argument against the hedonistic theory of well-being, formalized (P = premise, C = conclusion)

(P1)

If the only thing one’s well-being turns on is the total balance of pleasure over pain in one’s life, and we want our lives to go better for us rather than worse, then, if an experience is more pleasurable than another, we should choose the more pleasurable experience.

(P2)

One will experience more pleasure if one is plugged into the machine compared to not being plugged in.

(C1)

If the hedonistic theory of well-being is true we should plug ourselves into the machine.

(P3) [2]

People don’t want to plug themselves into the machine.

( P4)

There are other things people value than just experiencing as much pleasure as possible.

(C2)

Hedonism about well-being is wrong.

This is a valid argument, the conclusions follow the premises and the premises can’t be true and the conclusion false. In this essay I will try to show that the argument isn’t a sound argument by showing that (P4) can’t be taken for granted.

Does it work?

Below I will be presenting two arguments against the experience machine thought experiment. I will call these argument “the authenticity argument” and, ”the simulation argument”. Following my presentation of these arguments I will try to defend them by responding to arguments one may have against them.

The authenticity argument

The experience machine thought experiment rebuts the hedonistic theory of well-being by arguing that a person wants to have authentic [3] experiences we don’t want to be loved and love others artificially. A person faced with the decision of entering the experience machine wouldn’t want to enter because they want to have authentic experiences not artificial. This argument, I think, doesn’t quite hold. How are we to know what is authentic and what is not? Isn’t in the end everything we do, from listening to music to tasting food to feeling the sun warm our skin, just experienced by us? Every sensory input and internal stimuli generated by our brain and body will always just be experienced by us. They are all also processed and filtered by our body, so we can therefore never be certain about what’s authentic and what’s not.

The simulation argument

This argument is an upgraded version of the authenticity argument. We can’t be certain that our universe isn’t part of a bigger, more complex simulation nor can we be certain that we aren’t all already plugged into a machine similar to the experience machine, without us knowing of it. Maybe we were all faced with a similar decision in another universe, time and space, and we all made the decision to plug ourselves into that machine and we ended up where we are now. That simulation in turn could be part of another simulation that is part of another simulation etc., like an onion with infinitely many layers. So, what difference would it make making a jump between one simulation and another, or plugging ourselves into yet another machine? My answer is none, it wouldn’t make any difference because we can never know what’s a simulation and what’s real (if we can even consider some things more real than others). I therefore think that the argument that we don’t want artificial experiences doesn’t hold.

Here people might say that this way of arguing against the experience machine will lead to some radical conclusions. They might say something like this: If we can never be certain of what’s authentic and what is not, then we’ll not be able to distinguish reality from fiction. And this in turn could lead to unwanted consequences like the justification of murder by people arguing that they didn’t know if the person they killed was authentic or not.

To this I would respond that that’s a fair point. But, my argument need not be viewed as a prescriptive argument (how things should be) but rather as a descriptive argument (how things are). We humans may need to believe in something as authentic, or genuinely real, in order to experience living a good life, but that still doesn’t mean that it is authentic. What I wanted to bring forth in my argument is that we should be careful of falling into the belief that we think everything is fixed and that our perspective as humans is the only one possible.

Would you get in the Experience Machine?

I would, after having considered the arguments above, enter the experience machine. In my opinion the arguments for plugging oneself into the machine weighs heavier than the arguments against. But, I must say that I’m acting contrary to my instincts. It’s hard to think outside of my comfort zone and see things through another, maybe more objective, perspective. I guess this feeling has to do with the fact that I’m afraid of, essentially, losing my sense of consciousness and being. Even though I find it hard to not accept or take into account the arguments above I wouldn’t want to jeopardize my being. But I would, as stated above, get into the machine.

What does this tell us about Hedonism?

The experience machine thought experiment conclude that the hedonistic theory of well-being is wrong. Above I have argued that this experiment doesn’t hold to fully rebut this theory of well-being but I have not argued that hedonism is right nor that you can’t prove it wrong. This essay just argue against the experience machine thought experiment and it doesn’t tell us much about hedonism.


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[1] High-quality pleasures, as described by John Stuart Mill, are pleasures that only humans have the capacity of attaining, via as an example rational-thought and self-awareness. Having sex and enjoying food are pleasures we share with other animals.

[2] This premise just tells us that some people aren’t hedonists, and says not that hedonism is wrong. We could also ask whether this is based on empirical studies or on armchair intuitions (where you, based on your feelings and thoughts, assume everyone else must feel the same way)

[3] In this essay I will exclusively use the words “authentic” and “authenticity” to represent what we consider reality or what’s real, as opposed to represent meaningfulness.

***


2. Philosophical Relativism

Question

Can Philosophical Relativism be successfully defended? Explain why this theory is found plausible by some and address the objection to it you find most compelling. Is this objection decisive? If not, how can the Relativist reply to it?

Introduction

I will in this essay try to argue that philosophical relativism can’t be successfully defended. I’m putting emphasis on “try” since I haven’t taken into account every argument a relativist might have in favor of philosophical relativism and I can therefore not decisively argue that it can’t be successfully defended.

I will first describe what philosophical relativism is. I will then present two reasons why some people might find this theory plausible. Following this I will present my main criticism of philosophical relativism and then respond to three arguments a relativist might have against it. I will call these arguments “Bite the Bullet”, “Contextual relativism” and the “Preference argument”. Following this I will present another respons a relativist might have to counter the criticism. I will call this argument “cultural relativism”.

Philosophical relativism

Philosophical relativism is a theory that argues that every view and belief is equally legitimate - that they are on a par with each other and that you can’t prove that one belief is better or worse than the other. This theory is one of several ways you can go if you think that there are no objective moral truths, because you needn’t be a relativist to think that there are no moral objective truths. A philosophical relativist acknowledges, in an individual or a cultural ethical disagreement, that the other party’s view is on a par with his or hers and that they both have equally legitimate views. Even in a case of fundamental ethical disagreement the relativist would say that both views are equally legitimate.

Why some people find the theory plausible

First and foremost I would like to clarify that there is a difference between what is plausible and what is attractive. If someone finds a theory plausible they needn’t be attracted by it and vice versa. Furthermore, some people might find the theory plausible because they are attracted by it and vice versa.

Some people find the theory of philosophical relativism plausible because they have acknowledged that there don’t seem to be any moral objective truths.

Some people might also find the theory plausible because they have acknowledged that there don’t seem to be any decisive solutions to moral problems.

Criticism of philosophical relativism

One salient counterargument to the theory of philosophical relativism is that it can’t refute views that are morally wrong. If all views are to be seen as equally legitimate it would also allow for the justification of morally wrong actions. A philosophical relativist would have to say that the Nazi’s view on jews is equally legitimate as someone who holds a different view, since everyone is justified to hold their own views as long as it accords with their fundamental values. Below are three responses a relativist may have to counter the argument above:

Bite the bullet

Yes, the Nazi’s view on jews is a view that is as legitimate as any other to hold and all moralities are equal. There are no moral objective truths.

Contextual relativism

The meaning of legitimate, or of right and wrong, or of true or false is dependent on the context. The meaning of these terms are subject to change and the usage of them different from one culture to another, so I can therefore not argue that their view, back then, is morally right or wrong.

Preference argument

Even if someone is a relativist they can favor some views over others and have a strong inner feeling of what is right and wrong, only they are not entitled to interfere with other people’s views. They can’t prove that their view is somehow better than another view but they might still prefer one. So, they can say that they are strongly against how the Nazi’s viewed the jews but that they can’t prove that that view is better or worse than the Nazi’s.

The “Bite the bullet” argument above in defence of philosophical and semantic relativism seems to be a rather extreme argument that could allow for the justification of murder. The consequences of “Contextual relativism” is that the terms lose their meaning. If we can’t be certain that the term “true” means the same thing independent of context then we won’t be able to communicate with each other. The “Preference argument” does not really solve the problem with having to accept the justification of morally wrong actions because it still allows for them. Furthermore, it doesn’t allow for moral progress.

Cultural relativism

A philosophical relativist might also object that one culture should not interfere with another culture and that we should let each and every culture decide what is best for themselves. Why should we think that a culture who fosters a certain set of moral values, different from another culture’s values, are justified to judge or force their values upon the other? Maybe that other culture, by their measurements and standards of what is good and bad, are equally or more satisfied, or justified, to hold their beliefs than the first.

To this argument a person who rejects relativism may object that a person can be part of several different groups and cultures. These groups may also have totally different views and there may be difficulties in identifying which truths are relative to which groups. This means that the person who is part of several different groups may not know which norms or moral values they should adhere to.

I would all in all say that this counterargument to philosophical relativism is decisive but I can still imagine how a relativist might be able to respond to them (see above). We have also seen that the relativist's replies just lead to other problems.


***


3. Bentham's Arguments for Utilitarianism

Question

In Chapters 1 and 2 of his Principles of Morals and Legislation, Bentham offers three arguments for the claim that Utilitarianism is the correct moral theory. Describe each argument briefly, and then pick out the one that you believe is strongest. Explain that argument in the most persuasive way you can. Then assess the argument from a critical perspective. Raise at least one objection to it. Then consider how Bentham might reply. In the end, are you persuaded by that argument? Why or why not?

Introduction

In this essay I will first describe shortly what the utilitarian theory of morality consists of. Following this I will describe three arguments of Bentham’s that purport to show that Utilitarianism is the correct moral theory. These arguments will be called 1. “The semantic argument”, 2. “The argument from human nature” and 3. “The incoherence of rival views”. Then I will explain the third argument as persuasively as I can, since I find this argument to be the strongest of the three, and raise one objection to it. I will call this objection the “every moral theory” objection. Following this I will consider how Bentham may reply to my objection, and then explain why I find the “incoherence of rival views” argument persuasive.

Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism which assesses actions as right or wrong based on their results. The utilitarian theory of morality says that, when we are faced with a choice of actions, we should choose the action that promotes the most net good (e.g happiness and pleasure), i.e: the action that maximizes utility when we have subtracted pain from pleasure. That action is said to be the only morally right action to take and all the others morally wrong.

The three arguments

Here are three of the arguments Bentham brings forth to support Utilitarianism.

1. The semantic argument

This argument is based around the notion of what the terms “right” and “wrong” mean. Bentham thought that the terms “right” and “wrong” couldn’t possibly have any other meaning than “productive of benefit” and “productive of harm”. Bentham doesn’t give us any argument in favor of this claim, rather he is asking us if we can argue for the meaning of these terms to be different, and if so, how? The argument also says that Utilitarianism is the only moral theory that uses these terms in that way.

2. The argument from human nature

A second argument Bentham brings forth appeals to the nature of humans. He states that the utilitarian theory of morality is the only theory that is in conformity with human nature. Bentham supports this claim by saying that we humans are all already applying the utilitarian principle in our daily lives (perhaps unconsciously and inconsistently); we tend to avoid pain and seek pleasure. He also points out that we humans naturally approve of actions that increase pleasure and that we disapprove of actions that increase pain.

3. The incoherence of rival views

The third argument says that all other ethical systems are tacitly relying on, or are covert applications of, utilitarianism or that they are just unsystematic collections of our likes and dislikes.

Of these three arguments I find the third argument to be the strongest and I will below explain it as persuasively as I can.

The incoherence of rival views

My view is this [1]: If morality is to have worthwhile meaning for us humans, then, it has to be connected to human well-being. Furthermore, I think morality needs to function as a tool for us humans to determine which actions to take and which actions to avoid; that is, have real world applications. Even though there might be other [2] moral theories, such as hedonism, based on this notion of morality, I would argue that these views are applications of Utilitarianism, and that Utilitarianism is the basis on which these other views rely on. I cannot prove my claim since I cannot take into account every possible moral theory, but Utilitarianism is in my opinion the most neutral and grounded moral theory based on this notion: take the action that promotes the most net good, nothing else.

If we look at hedonism or virtue ethics or deontology, and ask ourselves and their subscribers how they would argue in favor their moral theory, and how they would go about convincing others that their moral theory is the best, I think that their arguments would have to appeal to human well-being in some way or another. If they don’t, I don’t think that a lot of people would be interested in the theory. They have to say something along the lines of: “My moral theory is the best since it tells me to do this because this results in that…, and that thing is desirable, or good.... This I think, is the reason why Bentham makes his assertion that all other moral theories are just covert applications of Utilitarianism.

Below I will describe the “every moral theory” counter-argument.

The “every moral theory” counter-argument

A person who disagrees with the “incoherence with rival views” argument might say that the argument doesn't hold since we can never be certain that there are no other moral theories that don’t rely on utilitarian principles; and the “incoherence with rival views” argument says that all other theories are just applications of Utilitarianism.

How Bentham might reply

Bentham would perhaps say that yes, we can never be certain that we have exhausted every moral theory, but we can never be 100% certain of anything. So this counter-argument, even if it works as a counter-argument to refute the “incoherence of rival views” argument, doesn’t carry that much weight because it could be a counter-argument to every argument ever made. Rather, if we look at every moral theory that has been presented so far we can see that they all rely on utilitarian principles [3].

Am I persuaded by the argument in the end? Why, why not?

I am persuaded by the original “incoherence of rival views” argument even though I can see how people can argue both in favor of Bentham’s argument or in favor of the “every moral theory” counter-argument. The counter-argument speaks to me since I am a person who appreciates precision, but still, the “incoherence of rival views” argument is in my opinion the stronger of the two. This is because I have an innate feeling that we humans have to be able to apply our knowledge, our thoughts and our wisdom to the the world, and that morality has to be connected with human well-being if morality is to have any worthwhile meaning for us. I also think that we have to accept that we can’t (at least at the moment), be 100% certain of everything, because if we don’t, we won’t make any progress as individuals or as a society; we will constantly be stuck in theoretical outcomes and never be able to take action.


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[1] In this essay I am solely focusing on moral theories that, in my eyes, promote the connection between morality and human well-being, in my eyes: hedonism, virtue ethics and deontology I am fully aware that one could reject my whole argument and my claims just by saying that there is no connection between them, but, as I said I am only focused on this specific area in this essay.

[2] Henceforth when I write “other moral theories” I am only focusing, as stated above, on moral theories, that in my eyes, promote the connection between morality and human well-being.

[3] Let’s take deontology and virtue ethics. Bentham may have replied that “to be a virtuous person is good, or desirable, only because it leads to either an inner feeling of well-being, or to your being viewed by others as a good person, or to you letting others have an opportunity to experience well-being. So, it’s not the virtues themselves that are good, but the good they result in.

Bentham would probably have argued in the same way when it comes to deontology. He may have replied “Well, the rules set for us to follow, will lead to us acting in the right way are relying on utilitarian principles”. I think he would have supported his claim by saying, as has been previously mentioned, that if you ask a deontologist why you should subscribe to deontology he would probably have to (perhaps unconsciously) appeal to human well-being.


***


4. Killing one to save five

Question

When is it morally okay to kill one person so as to prevent five people from being killed?

- How would an act consequentialist think about this question?

What would an act consequentialist say about the cases we considered in Lecture 13?

- Does the act consequentialist get these cases right?

- If not, what is the right general account of when it is morally okay to kill one person so as to save five?

Introduction

In this essay I will look at how an act consequentialist (henceforward called “AC”) would think about questions and thought experiments that involve killing one so as to save five other people from being killed. I will also argue that it may be possible to come up with a general principle for when it would be morally okay to kill one so as to save five so long as we don’t mix in our intuitions in the discussion.

When is it morally okay to kill one person to save five people from being killed?

Depending on which moral theory one is subscribed to and which moral intuitions one might have one could respond differently to this question. Some people say that you should never kill one to save five, while others say that you should always do it. Some people are not sure and for some it varies.

Below I will shortly describe act consequentialism and then see how an act consequentialist (“AC”) may reply to this question.

Act consequentialism

Act consequentialism is a form of consequentialism which says that the only morally right action to take is the one that produces the most the net-good (the total bad of everyone subtracted from the total good of everyone), when compared with the net-good of other actions the agent can take.

An “AC”’s response to the question “When is it morally okay to kill one to save five from being killed?”

Given the following presuppositions: Each life in this situation counts for an equal amount of, let’s call them utility-points. The situation takes place in a closed universe, that is, we neglect everything else that has not been explicitly said to be part of the situation, e.g, people that might judge your acting. Given these presuppositions an “AC” would always say that you should kill the one person to save the five from being killed, since it’s the action that results in the most net-good compared with the action of not doing anything and letting five people die.

Below I will explain 3 thought experiments which all are based on, and are modified versions of, the question given above. I will first describe each of them and then see how an “AC” may reply (still given the presuppositions above). These thought experiments combined with the solutions an “AC” gives to them aim to evoke doubts about act consequentialism.

Different cases to test act consequentialism

Blood

You are a doctor and you have an anesthetized patient on a table. Five of your other patients need one liter blood each to survive and the anesthetized patient could provide it, but he’d die in the process of donating the blood. Should you suck the blood out of the anesthetized patient (thereby killing him) and save the five others that would otherwise die?

Trolley Problems

Footbridge

A trolley is heading toward five persons on a track and the driver has lost control over it. You and a large fellow are standing on a footbridge that goes over the track. By knocking the large fellow off the bridge and causing him to fall onto the track and die when the trolley hits him, you could save the five persons that would otherwise have died by the trolley (the large fellow slows it down). Should you knock him over?

Switch

A trolley is heading toward five people and the driver has lost control. You are now instead standing next to a switch and you can pull the switch causing the trolley to change tracks. On the other track there’s another person. Should you pull the switch and save five persons that would otherwise have been killed but kill the one on the other track or don’t and let the five persons die?

Does the act consequentialist get the cases right?

Given the same presuppositions as above an “AC” would always kill one so as to save five others from being killed. I take it your immediate reaction to this is that the “AC” acts wrongly by killing the large fellow, but you may feel that it seems okay (or at least not wrong) to pull the switch. Personally I’m not entirely sure, but I still feel as though the act consequentialist’s way of acting is a bit radical.

Is it possible to come up with a general principle for when it’s okay to kill one to save five? A general principle that sorts the cases above in the “right” way; not pushing the large fellow off the bridge (Footbridge), but still maybe allowing for one to pull the switch (Switch)?

General moral principle for when it’s ok to kill one so as to save five?

My view is that we can come up with a general principle for the cases above. Maybe that principle encompasses all of our intuitions and gut feelings, maybe not, and my point is that it doesn’t necessarily have to do that. Why should our intuitions set the standard for plausibility or for morally justifiable actions?

We humans have evolved to act in certain ways in certain situations. Why rule out a general principle such as “take the action that promotes the most net-good; in the cases above, kill one to save five.” based on our intuitions? Our intuitions are not only unreliable but they are also inconsistent. Our intuitions of what’s morally right or wrong might change over time and acting on them doesn’t always lead to the “best” outcome.

The reason as to why we humans won’t push the large fellow off the bridge is due to evolution. When we are standing on the footbridge we are unconsciously thinking about how our acting will be viewed upon by others, even if we can’t see anyone there. Maybe there’s someone there, only you can’t see him. If, on the off-chance there is someone there judging your acting, you would be worse off pushing the large fellow than not pushing him since the watcher may then view you as untrustworthy. In the past you’d not want to risk getting alienated from your group.

To say that it is impossible to come up with a general principle for the cases above, or to rule out theories or principles, based on our intuitions, I find short-sighted.

20 juli 2020

Skepticism about growth and clean energy is not anti-humanistic

Jacobin recently published a kind of meta-review of Michael Moore's latest film "Planet of the Humans", portraying it as anti-growth, anti-progressive, anti-working class, Malthusian, anti-humanistic and even anti-human.

The author - with his own agenda - actually agrees with much of the film's content but distorts its underlying message and puts his own ideological spin on the facts.

My main objections to the text are the following.

First of all, there is no connection between the terms: skepticism about the economic growth paradigm or about the feasibility of truly clean energy production does not mean or imply anti-progressiveness, anti-humanism or worse. That's just hyperbole.

Second, there are good reasons to be skeptical about growth (as currently defined) and about de-coupling. There are as yet no convincing case for the possibility of de-coupling, let alone for it actually materializing. Even if it were theoretically possible, the sensible thing to do at the moment is to act on the presumption that it cannot be counted on.

Third, there are no convincing life-cycle analyses that show that truly clean energy can be self-sustaining. (This includes nuclear power.) Until it is, arguing for increasing energy consumption is irresponsible. That is not to say that nuclear power should not be a part of current efforts to reduce climate change.

Fourth, the fact that more people using more energy equals higher energy demand is axiomatic. As long as energy production and consumption entails even the slightest bit of environmental degradation, acknowledging that this is a problem is not in itself an anti-human sentiment.

Fifth, there is no reason to equate the terms "progressive" and "techno-optimist". We should be socially progressive, first and foremost. That may or may not include deployment of technology. Laissez-faire in the hopes of finding a Philosopher's Stone powerful enough to save us is irresponsible.

Sixth, there is a lot more to humanism than the utilitarian goal of populating the universe, or even the Earth, with infinitely many infinitely blissful centers of consciousness.

Seventh, there is no necessary connection between consumption and well-being (beyond a certain baseline).

So, to rewrite the text, I would say that yes, we should certainly make sure that efforts to reduce our environmental impact does not disproportionately impact poor people. Especially since they are not the problem. On the contrary, we should prioritize increasing their well-being, and whatever carbon-budget we decide on should be used primarily for this purpose even if that means tighter budgets for everyone else. Development and deployment of technology should focus on raising standards of living for the least well-off with little or no increase in environmental degradation.

At the same time, people who are reasonably well-off already - and rich people and corporations in particular - must decrease their energy-and-material use drastically and rapidly.

As much as possible, connections between well-being and material-and-energy use must be dissolved. This is where social (and sometimes technological) progress should operate.

---

See also: Planet of the Humans (in Swedish) and Ekofascism?

The pneumatic theory of atheism

Someone wrote on Twitter:

If we don't consciously and constructively work with the religious impulse that co-evolved with and was indispensable to cultural evolution, it will continue to manifest itself unconsciously and perniciously in ostensibly secular institutions.

I recognize the sentiment. I've heard it many times before. On both sides of the aisle. Even prominent "new atheists" like Daniel Dennett and Richard Dawkins have deemed it necessary to address and adapt to it.

I don’t find it convincing.

I guess many people who are brought up in a religious environment take for granted that everyone, inevitably, has a ’religious impulse’ and that atheists are posers or ascetics or exceptions. But I don’t think that’s true.

As a Swede I have lived my whole life with almost no contact with religion at all: personally, socially or in society as a whole. Most people I have ever come in contact with have never shown any ’unconscious’ or ’pernicious’ urges or emotional voids sublimated into anything remotely obsessive or dysfunctional. It just isn’t such a big deal.

Religion, or even ’spirituality’, is certainly not necessary, neither psychologically nor sociologically. It just seems that way to people who are surrounded by it. The zealousness of some ’new atheists’, ’rationalists’ etc. isn’t a symptom of unfulfilled existential needs. It’s just a consequence of the fact that religion is so obviously destructive.

Without religion it would be so much easier to actually get on with building ’secular institutions’ that are the exact opposite of ’pernicious’ to social progress. To someone outside any religious framework, finding meaning by engaging productively with community and society comes as easy, or even easier, starting from neutral ground rather than from within a religious framework, or in opposition to one, or even as an alternative to one.

14 juni 2020

More by Moffett: Nationalists and Patriots

About fifteen years ago, as my friend and I walked across the town square, I remember saying:

There's really only one Big Question remaining: People seem to fall into two categories - liberals and conservatives. Why is that? Is it inevitable?

This split seems to me to be the biggest, possibly the only, real obstacle to genuine progress. How should it be addressed? Can it be dissolved?

Since then, I've read a lot. And a lot has happened. If I was asked yesterday to write an essay to answer my own question, it would hopefully have started something like this.

People's outlooks on many pressing social issues betray how these roles [protection vs. provision] are valued differently depending on whether individuals subscribe to patriotism or nationalism. As most psychologists use the words today, these are habits of thought that represent distinct expressions of how people identify with their society. Sometimes lumped together, patriotism and nationalism become plain, and clash with each other, in troubled times. Depending on the person, perspectives shift to more nationalist or more patriotic viewpoints during periods of stress. Yet each individual usually sticks within a narrow range of attitudes over the course of his or her life; the sentiments emerge in childhood under the dual influence of inheritance and upbringing. 
The fundamental difference between nationalism and patriotism is that while individuals with both outlooks are devoted to their society, they relate to it differently. Patriots display pride in their people and a sense of shared identity and particularly of belonging; such a feeling comes naturally to those born in a country but can be acquired by immigrants. With most of their passion directed at their own group, patriots prioritize the needs of its members: making sure they have food, housing, an education, and so on. Nationalists have similar emotions but couch their identity in glorification. Their pride connects with prejudice. As obsessed as patriots can be with caring for the members, nationalists are absorbed with preserving a superior way of life by keeping the society safe and sound and putting their own people prominently on the world stage. 
Where it gets interesting is that patriots and nationalists have divergent ideas of who constitutes "their own people." Indeed, among the aspects of their identity nationalists admire are those that set the trusted majority apart. It's this position they guard. The extreme nationalist ardently protects each detail of that identity to keep the nation firmly associated with the angels. The priorities of nationalists include staunch demonstrations of loyalty, accepting customary rules of order, obeying leaders whom they see as responsible, and maintaining the established social relationships, most clearly between ethnicities and races. All of these values came to the fore as people settled down and began dominating others. Tradition-driven nationalists believe in their country no matter what. They commit to the status quo, at times at odds with those democratic ideals that allow for transformation: their personalities are less open to new experiences and social change. Compare this my country right or wrong stance to the outlook of patriots, who likewise give their country a high standing yet believe it must be earned rather than fought for, allowing that there are possibilities for improvement. 
In their attention to differences between groups, nationalists treat both people of other nations and minority citizens as outsiders, taking a narrow view of who is, at the heart, truly part of the society. They're more comfortable with the majoritarian idea of democracy in which the dominant people should have the primary say in governance. Their perspectives on moral and legal issues reflects this. I believe it fair to say that to a nationalist, a person of another ethnicity, citizen or not, is relatively more foreign
Earlier I called ants extreme nationalists because they stick tight to their colony marker - its scent - as a stamp of their identity. Indeed, though in our species a patriot can become as teary-eyed as any nationalist in displays of allegiance to a flag or anthem, nationalists are supersensitive to those symbols. For them brief exposure to a flag or an idolized leader incites an intense reaction - as does the absence of such an emblem when one is expected. Thus the uproar about gymnast Gabby Douglas not placing a hand over her heart while the American national anthem played in the 2012 Olympics, a lapse that to a nationalist made her gold-medal win too much about herself and not about the United States. The reaction was a sign of the sentiment that societies are entities: people don't compete in the games, countries do. 
Both the nationalist and the patriot perspectives can be logically consistent, with nationalists being more risk averse and on guard against anything that may contaminate their culture. They prefer to err on the side of separatism, erecting boundaries that might alienate those whose interests could differ from their own, while patriots are more sympathetic to opportunities for trade and cooperation with outsiders. 
In short, the nationalist is suspicious of diversity, while patriots often welcome it. Or at least they tolerate it, because even a patriot, no matter how equality-minded, isn't immune to prejudice: the ardor that patriots reserve for fellow society members of their own race or ethnicity still leads to discrimination as they subtly, and unwittingly, treat those like themselves more fairly. 
Why did these differences in patriotic and nationalistic attitudes evolve? The fact is that a clash in perspectives within societies, although at times so extreme as to verge on the dysfunctional, may have always been integral to human survival. Our varied expression of social viewpoints probably connects back to "timeless social concerns," as one research team put it. Each outlook is beneficial in certain contexts. This dimension of our social identity may be an adaption to balancing the needs for protecting and provisioning the society. Even though people with opposing perspectives might not see eye to eye, a society with too few or too many individuals at either end of the spectrum could be open to catastrophes. This promotion of behavioral diversity has parallells in unlikely animal species. Social spiders are most successful when their colonies contain both individuals that retreat from danger but fastidiously tend the nest, and bold ones that put more effort into defense against social parasites, which steal the colony's food; the colonies of certain ant species function most efficiently when they contain a similarly effective mix of personality types. 
For humans, the hazards of a population overly committed to either the nationalist or patriot extreme are manifest. Nationalists see the patriot's greater openness to weak borders and sharing across ethnicities as promoting social dependence and cheating, fears that reflect the competitive nature of groups present across species. Meanwhile, the prevalence of nationalists, convinced their ways are right and prepared to fight for them, means the dangers that nationalists fear can indeed be realized. Still, by readily espousing oppression and aggression, extreme nationalists bring to mind the historian Henry Adam's description of politics as a systematic organization of hatreds. Their outlook feeds on certain facets of psychology. It's intoxicating to fall in line against an enemy, at times at a whiff of trouble. For those swept up in a nationalist perspective, the swell of group emotions and awareness of common purpose gives life a greater meaning. Not just morale, but mental health improve among civilians when nations face conflict. The fact is, trigger-happy societies have long had an edge, with the impulse for war and the fear of attack critical in driving many social and technical innovations and the expansion of states. What's more, nationalists, adhering to a narrow interpretation about what behaviors are proper, have the advantage of being far mor tight-knit and homogeneous than patriots and better able to act together. All this is to say that the patriot's vantage point is and always will be a more onerous path. 
Because of the partiality for their group, displayed by patriots and nationalists in different ways, the troubles our societies face go deep. It's bad enough that a wicked act by one minority person - the Florida nightclub shooting, for example - can set off outrage at an entire minority population. But mistreatment can carry over to ethnicities unconnected to the tragedy. That's an outcome of how stereotypes strip away detailed understanding, making it easy to conflate groups to the point of creating such fuzzy and nonsensical categories as "brown people." Even when no conflation exists, prejudices can be linked, with the denigration of one people associated with the devaluation of others. Persons who fear for their safety, jobs, or way of life indiscriminately lump them together much as ancient societies did with the "barbarians" beyond their borders. The impulse is so strong that when a sample of Americans was asked what they thought of Wisians, nearly 40 percent regarded them poorly and did not want them as neighbors, even though they could have known nothing about them since the researcher had made the name up. 
Societies contain ethnicities and races that stick together despite the members' prejudices about each other. The usual view, voiced by William Sumner more than a century ago, is that friction with outsiders draws a society together. Clearly, that's not always true. The external forces that promote civil peace primarily galvanize the dominant people while often straining their ties to a society's other ethnicities when those groups are regarded as part of the problem. This tension among the members can cause a kind of social autoimmune disease, turning a society against itself. For all these tribulations, we may reasonably ask whether societies are necessary at all.

--- Moffett, M.W. (2019), The Human Swarm, pp. 340-343


I am eager to read the concluding chapters of Moffett's book. Twenty or so pages remaining.

Just for the record: The fact that 40 percent of Americans shun Wisians isn't primarily attributable to individual nationalist tendencies, but to ignorance - which in turn isn't primarily attributable to individual personality traits, but to engineered anti-enlightenment. Any reasonable system of governance would, over time, not only steer the U.S. towards liberalism - in a broad sense - but would simultaneously narrow the divide between liberals and conservatives. (So conservatives would move more rapidly towards liberal values, even as the gap remains.)


13 juni 2020

Inventing foreigners

The disbanding of a society is a time of reinvention. Any reading of history suggests society breakups mirror the breakup of a marriage. When one can't turn back from a split, years of repressed opinions come pouring out that may express the opposite of what had been professed a month, if not the day, before. As pressures to conform to social norms shift, diminish, or vanish entirely, people on both sides gain the latitude to explore ways of interacting that had been out of favor or considered heretical. Previously unacceptable acts can leap to the forefront, helping each group distance itself from those who are now other, reimagined as outsiders, such that they come to appear ever more foreign.

The evidence indicates that many of the modifications of daughter societies - their character displacement, to borrow again a term from biology - occur in the initial years after they go their separate ways. Their newfound freedom of expression may be a reason why. That's when language - and no doubt many other, less studied aspects of identity - undergoes the fastest rate of change, before settling into a relative stasis thereafter. Indeed, distinctions between societies, often enough, are an outcome not of their ignorance of each other due to geographical separation, but of their awareness of and interaction with each other. This would be conspicuously true after societies split up. The opportunities for independent thought and invention afforded by a newly minted society, leading to a convergence of perceptions around themes the members can celebrate as their own, can make its formative years a golden age. For example, the Declaration of Independence and US Constitution remain the reference points that Americans turn to for guidance when questions about the nation's governance arise. Based on what is known about modifications in identity, I believe this would have been the case over the course of our evolution as it is now.

Yet there would be a deeper psychological impetus for a reworking of identity to bloom right after a division. The sense of being adrift, their fates severed from the meaning and purpose the larger society once provided, would heighten the urgency of the people's search for a strong identity, and essence, that stands apart. Moreover, their identification with each other must actually matter. Certain groups, such as people experiencing homelessness or those who are obese, may be marginalized but don't create societies with identities of their own. Neither do sick or disabled chimps or elephants, even when others treat them as outcasts. These outliers fail to bond since they do not see others with their condition in a good light. They lack what psychologists describe as positive distinctiveness.

Hence the insights of psychologists suggest that the members of a start-up society will toil to distinguish themselves favorably. To achieve this, they improvise cherished attributes or express old ones in a special way. The process is analogous to the development of traits that biologists studying the divergence of species call isolating mechanisms. Whatever commonalities remain with the other society can be denied or ignored. Like divorcees not on speaking terms, the societies can break off contact, which would mean any shared history would be eschewed or forgotten. Regardless, no matter how alike the newbie societies might seem to outside eyes, reunification would quickly be impossible.

From: Moffett, The Human Swarm, pp. 261-262

10 juni 2020

Cockroach

There was nothing in the near-infinite compendium of EU rules and trade protocols of the customs union that prevented a member state from reversing the circulation of its finances. That did not quite represent permission. Or did it? It was a defining principle of an open society that everything was lawful until there was a law against it. Beyond Europe’s eastern borders, in Russia, China and all the totalitarian states of the world, everything was illegal unless the state sanctioned it. In the corridors of the EU, no one had ever thought of excluding the reverse flow of money from acceptable practice because no one had ever heard of the idea. Even if someone had, it would have been difficult to define the legal or philosophical principles by which it should be illegal. An appeal to basics would not have helped. Everyone knew that in every single law of physics, except one, there was no logical reason why the phenomena described could not run backwards as well as forwards. The famous exception was the second law of thermodynamics. In that beautiful construct, time was bound to run in one direction only. The Reversalism was a special case of the second law and therefore in breach of it! Or was it? This question was hotly debated in the Strasbourg Parliament right up until the morning the members had to decamp to Brussels, as they frequently had to. By the time they had arrived and unpacked and enjoyed a decent lunch, everyone had lost the thread, even when a theoretical physicist came specially from the CERN laboratories to set everything straight in less than three hours with some interesting equations. Besides, the next day a further question arose. Would what the scientist said remain true if he’d said it in reverse?

— McEwan, The Cockroach

2 juni 2020

GPT-3: Filtrering eller resonemang?





Kilchers beskrivning känns uppenbart riktig, snudd på trivial. Att artikelförfattarna överdriver hur mycket, och vilken typ av ’resonerande’ som försiggår är förvånande och närmast pinsamt.

Visst finns det mycket som är imponerande, eller åtminstone anmärkningsvärt kraftfullt. (Wow-faktorn minskar ju i proportion till hur mycket tid och plats modellen och träningen har fått.)

Och visst kan det få stora, och eventuellt negativa konsekvenser om det blir riktigt lätt att generera hyfsat kontextkänsliga och åtminstone hyfsat ’unika’ texter vars artificiella upphov inte alltid lätt går att upptäcka.

Och visst kan man tänka sig att detta blir särskilt pikant om och när det kombineras med mer avancerat resonerande.

Men att påstå att den här mekanismen utför något mer än just det Kilcher säger - det verkar bara dumt.

Sen kan man ju alltid fråga sig var gränsen går mellan plagiat och ’försteåelse’, ’kunskap’, ’kompetens’... Om en elev/student får i uppgift att, säg, skriva en resonerande uppsats och lämnar in en kopia av en befintlig text, så är det ett uppenbart plagiat och inget bevis på egen förståelse. Om eleven läser och klipper och klistrar från flera olika texter på ämnet så är risken fortfarande stor att inlämningen flaggas i Urkund.

Men, bortsett från det verkligt originella, är det inte detta alla gör - och uppmanas att göra! - både för att lära sig och för att uppvisa bevis på att lärande har skett? Åtminstone om vi låter mängden lästa och ’plagierade’ texter och textsnuttar växa tillräckligt mycket. Och hur många uppsatser, skrivna ’med egna ord’, ärligt uppsåt och vad vi skulle erkänna som genuin förståelse, kunskap och kompetens, skulle godkännas om vi uppgraderade Urkund till GPT3? (Beroende på hur vi ställer in och tolkar granularitet och känslighet.)

Detta gäller förstås - hittills - bara i specifika typer av uppgifter, som egentligen inte kräver mer flexibilitet än vad GPT3 uppvisar. Men de är ju faktiskt väldigt vanliga i verkligheten. (Om än inte tillräckliga.)

Det mest intressanta var väl det om ’explicability’. Det verkar ju faktiskt vara ganska straightforward i just denna typ av fall. Och det går säkert att generalisera. Men troligen kommer förklaringarna att kännas mer otillfredsställande, ju svårare uppgiften hade varit för en människa att, i princip, utföra. Förklaringen finns där, men (den oreducerbara) komplexiteten och/eller den upplevda irrelevansen (i förhållande till mänskliga kognitiva begränsningar eller tankekulturer) kommer troligtvis att motverka den nytta som man hoppas få.

31 maj 2020

Intellectual asceticism and the collapse of Western civilization

"These so-called 'holistic' approaches still focused almost entirely on natural systems, omitting from consideration the social components. Yet in many cases the social components were the dominant system drivers. It was often said, for example, that climate change was caused by increased atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. Scientists understood that those greenhouse gases were accumulating because of the activities of human beings: deforestation and fossil fuel combustion. Yet they rarely said that the cause was people and their patterns of conspicuous consumption.

"Other scholars have looked to the roots of Western natural science and religious institutions. Just as religious orders of prior centuries had demonstrated moral rigor through extreme practices asceticism in dress, lodging, behavior and food - in essence, practices of physical denial - so too did physical scientists of the 20th and 21st centuries attempt to demonstrate their intellectual rigor through practices of intellectual self-denial.

"These practices led scientists to demand an excessively stringent standard for accepting claims of any kind, even those involving imminent threats. In an almost childlike attempt to demarcate their practices from those of older explanatory traditions scientists felt it necessary to prove to themselves and the world how strict they were in their intellectual standards. Thus they places the burden of proof on novel claims, even empirical claims about phenomena that their theories predicted. This included claims about changes in the climate.

"Some scientists in the early 21st century, for example, had recognized that hurricanes were intensifying. This was consistent with the expectation, based on physical theory, that warmer sea surface temperatures in regions of cyclogenesis could - and likely would - drive either more hurricanes or more intense ones. However, they backed away from this conclusion under pressure from their scientific colleagues.

"Much of the argument surrounded the concept of statistical significance. Given what we now know about the dominance of nonlinear systems and the distribution of stochastic processes, the then-dominant notion of a 95 % confidence limit is hard to fathom. Yet, overwhelming evidence suggests that 20th century scientists believed that a claim could be accepted only if, by the standards of Fisherian statistics, the possibility that an observed event could have happened by chance was less than one in twenty.

"Many phenomena whose causal mechanisms were physically, chemically or biologically linked to warmer temperatures were dismissed as unproven because they did not adhere to the standards of demonstration.

"Historians have long argued about why this standard was accepted, given that it had neither epistemological nor substantive mathematical basis. We have come to understand the 95 % confidence limit as a social convention  rooted in scientists' desire to demonstrate their disciplinary severity.

"Western scientists built an intellectual culture based on the premise that it was worse to fool oneself into believing in something that did not exist than not to believe in something that did. Scientists referred to these positions  respectively as type 1 and type 2 errors, and established protocols designed to avoid type 1 errors at almost all costs. One scientist wrote: 'A type 1 error is often considered to be more serious and therefore more important to avoid than a type 2 error.' Another claimed that type 2 errors were not errors at all, just missed opportunities.

"So while the pattern of weather events was clearly changing many scientists insisted that these events could not yet be attributed with certainty to anthropogenic climate change. Even as lay citizens began to accept this link, the scientists who studied it did not. More important, political leaders came to believe that they had more time to act than they really did.

"The irony of these beliefs need not be dwelt on"

---

Transcribed from: Oreskes & Conway, "The Collapse of Western Civilization" (2014/2018), chapter 2 in the audio version, minutes 8-13.

23 maj 2020

The tribalism dogma

Given that, for significant numbers of humans, the First and Second Great Expansions have occurred, people who subscribe to the dogma that human beings have a tribalistic moral nature have two main options. Either they can give up the dogma entirely and admit that they simply didn't appreciate the flexibility of the moral mind because they confused the moral mind with the kind of moralities it was first expressed in; or they can soften the dogma by acknowledging that culture has stretched the tribalistic evolutionary leash in some cases, but assert that its doing so was a matter of going against our evolutionary grain, and that consequently any shift toward inclusion is bound to be anemic and unstable.

Obviously, I think the first response is the best: the belief that we are beings with a tribalistic moral nature should just be abandoned. To those who take the second option, my reply is simple: given that human moralities exhibit great diversity and that some people's moralities are not tribalistic, why should we say that our moral nature is tribalistic? It won't do for the die-hard defender of the dogma to cite evidence of the pervasiveness of tribalistic moral attitudes and beliefs, whether the evidence is historical or based on experiments, even if it is cross-cultural, because any such evidence is compatible with the hypothesis that our moral nature (the moral mind) is neither tribalistic nor inclusive, but rather so flexible as to be capable of being expressed in either tribalistic or inclusive moralities, depending on the environment.

In other words, to take historical or experimental evidence of tribalistic moral attitudes or behavior as conclusive confirmation of the thesis that humans have a tribalistic moral nature is to ignore the biased-sample problem I noted earlier. If the human-constructed niches in which the moral mind can get expressed in inclusive moralities are rare and recent, then concluding that human moral nature is tribalistic because most human moralities have been like that would be no more cogent than concluding that water flea nature includes protective spines and helmets because most of the water fleas you happened to have observed has those features.

The tribalism dogmatist has recourse to one last desperate fallback position: he can admit that human moral nature sometimes permits nontribalistic moralities, but insist that tribalism nevertheless is part of the moral mind itself, and that it is therefore still accurate to say that humans have a tribalistic moral nature. For the reasons given in the preceding paragraph, I don't think that we should say that tribalism is an element of our basic moral psychology, part of the moral mind itself - unless we quickly add that the moral mind also includes the capacity for inclusion. But if one grants that the moral mind is tribalistic in that weak sense - that tribalism is only one aspect of a moral nature that also encompasses inclusion, the result is a Pyrrhic victory.

Why? Because the thesis that humans have a tribalistic moral nature loses its punch if one admits that humans can act contrary to that aspect of their nature because of another aspect of their nature, namely, their capacity for inclusive morality. Admitting that our moral nature is dualistic saps the force of the assertion that we have a tribalistic moral nature.

Suppose that the last-ditch tribal dogmatist rejects the idea that our moral nature is dualistic and in response to the obvious fact that some moralities are now inclusive says that inclusion nonetheless goes against our nature. That is, suppose that he still asserts that our moral nature is tribalistic, period, not tribalistic and inclusive. Allowing for our moral nature to be overridden - saying, in effect, that we can act "unnaturally" - dilutes the notion of the nature of a thing. And that greatly reduces the interest and importance of the grand thesis that we are beings with a tribalistic moral nature. It also renders that thesis incapable of yielding any significant predictions about the scope of potential moral change or the space of possible moralities.

What I have to say in this book will still be important even if you dispense with talk of human moral nature altogether and fall back to a weaker, much less sexy thesis: namely, that human beings, by virtue of their evolutionary history, are predisposed to behave in a morally tribalistic way. To say that they are predisposed to tribalism means that exhibiting tribalistic moralities is the default position for humans, the way they tend to act, even if that tendency is sometimes not realized because of cultural influences. Its the default position, because the disposition to tribalism is an especially powerful aspect of our moral psychology.

If you hold that much weaker thesis, you can read me this way: I will show that in spite of this supposed predisposition, some humans have developed inclusive moralities, moralities that are not merely aspirational but socially and politically potent; and I will explain how they did that. In other words, I'll explain how they moved from situations in which that supposed predisposition largely determined the character of human moralities to situations in which that predisposition was inhibited or overridden or neutralized to such an extent that they developed inclusive moralities. In explaining this shift, I will show that the supposed predisposition to tribalism is not nearly as severe as one might think. I'll show that inclusive moralities are likely to persist, if the environments that are friendly to them are sustained. Inclusive moralities are fragile, in the sense that the capacity for tribalism never disappears; but that doesn't mean that inclusive moralities are inherently unstable and doomed to decay.

Finally, let me emphasize that there is a way of interpreting the experimental and historical evidence of tribalistic moral attitudes and behaviors that is compatible with rejecting the Tribalism Dogma, even in its weaker forms. Such evidence can be explained without concluding that humans have an especially powerful, deeply rooted, biologically based predisposition to tribalism if we make the following reasonable assumptions: (1) the moral mind is highly flexible; (2) most humans have lived in environments in which that flexibility issued in tribalistic moralities; (3) culture has developed in ways that sustain tribalistic moralities, even when they no longer promote reproductive fitness and are no longer necessary for successful cooperation; and (4) some people have an interest in maintaining (or resurrecting) tribalistic tendencies and they have the ability to do so effectively.

Each of these assumptions is highly credible. [...]

From: Allen Buchanan (2020),
Our Moral Fate: Evolution and the Escape from Tribalism,
MIT Press, Cambridge: MA.,
pp. 25-28



3 maj 2020

Ekofascism?

”Ekofascism” är ett märkligt skällsord. Man måste nog vara sociopat för att använda det.


Med terminologin i artikeln skulle jag kunna omformulera mitt ursprungliga utrop så här: Om man inte åtminstone är en prudentiell antropocentriker, så är man en sociopat. Och ska prudentiell betyda något meningsfullt så måste det förr eller senare innebära (accepterandet av eventuellt nödvändiga) kompromisser där enskilda människors intressen får stå tillbaka för helheten (inklusive alla andra människor, nu och i framtiden, samt deras miljö - oavsett hur mycket egenvärde man tillmäter denna miljö, och hur "naturlig" man insisterar på att den ska vara).

Callicotts holism, åtminstone i sin ursprungliga form, tarvade kritik, helt klart. Bland annat för att den inte var konsekvent. (Enskilda individer är ju en del av helheten och har därmed intrinsikalt värde.) Men Regans rop om "ekofascism" var minst lika missriktat. Den "misantropi" som han och andra varnar för låter i mina öron som ett brott mot hans egna principer: miniride och worst-off. Det verkar som om minsta inskränkning av en enskild individs handlingsutrymme är tabu för honom, och andra kritiker.

Diskussionen om "aristokrati" och "kolonialism" är i det här sammanhanget villospår. Varför skulle ex. uppmaningar till barnbegränsning etc. rikta sig i första hand till tredje världen; mer naturligt är väl att de i första hand riktar sig till väst och kompletteras med en uppfordran (plikt) att påskynda den sociala och teknologiska standarden i tredje världen, så att de så småningom kan följa efter - av upplyst egenintresse. Men det är kanske just där skon klämmer?

Om man vägrar att acceptera Malthus, och om man inte kan tänka sig en liberalism som modererar sina ambitioner, så förstår jag inte vad man har att göra inom miljöetik. Då har man ju på förhand deklarerat att man prioriterar någon princip högre än vår gemensamma långsiktiga överlevnad - och därmed i förlängningen även efterlevandet av denna princip. Om miljöetik ska vara intressant så måste den ju snarare handla om vilka principer som är långsiktigt hållbara.

Planet of the humans


Michael Moores nya film har fått mycket kritik. En del av den är korrekt (men av marginellt intresse); en del visar sig förhoppningsvis så småningom vara berättigad (vilket isåfall också berättigar Moores uppfordran att visa detta); en del är önsketänkande; en del körsbärsplockande (vilket Moore förvisso gör sig skyldig till, men bevisbördan ligger inte på honom); en del är positionering; en del i bästa fall välmenande politik; och en del är ren hysteri.

Men bara det faktum att McKibben, Sierra Club m.fl., och deras anhängare är så ömfotade visar att Moores inlägg är viktigt.

Påståendet att Moore går fossilindustrins ärenden, medvetet eller inte, är löjeväckande desperat. Dessutom osar det av dåligt samvete och whataboutism. (Huruvida Moore är oförvitlig är helt irrelevant.)

Sanna miljövänner välkomnar Moores ifrågasättande av teknikoptimism och termodynamiskt handviftande, och hans betoning av problemen med befolkningsökning, livsstil, tillväxt och kapitalism.

Kritik som inte explicit gör detta - och jag har inte sett någon sådan - tar jag inte på allvar.

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Och där kom det:

25 ways of looking at AI



Nu är det äntligen dags. Det ska bli spännande att se vilka författare jag håller med, och vilka som snackar goja. En gissning:


TROLIGEN BRA

Lloyd (Nja... Försiktig, ej övertygande)
Pearl (Ja! Ska genast köpa hans bok)
Russell * (Ja! Mycket är bra)
Dennett (Jodå. Fortfarande spänstig, och börjar - liksom Dyson - att närma sig Deacon)
Tegmark (Jaaa!)
Tallinn (Jaa!)
Wolfram (Jaa. Cool!)


OSÄKRA

Brooks (Helt OK)
Wilczek (Cool!)
Griffiths (Intressant. Läser gärna mer. Men hur är det med the big picture?)
Dragan (OK)
Anderson (Haha! Kul)
Kaiser (Jag blir nyfiken, vill läsa mer)
Gershenfeld (Bra. Spännande)
Ramakrishnan (My man! Ska läsa mer. Men inte om intelligens - där är han för "blöt")
Pentland (Mkt intressant! Asimov, Tuschin m.fl... Mercier & Sperber skulle behöva läsa detta)
Obrist (Öhh... nja...näe)
Galison (Trevlig)
Jones (Bah!)


TROLIGEN DÅLIGA

Dyson * (Mmm... Tänkvärd och kanske viktig, men saknar konkretion)
Pinker (Woah! Det är något skumt med denna styvnackade fanatism...)
Deutsch (Far out! Way too far out för att vara relevant. Hur mycket stryk fick D i skolan?)
Hillis * (Himla bra! Visdom)
Gopnik (Bra! Kant! Men varför slutsatsen att vi inte behöver oroa oss?)
Church (Öhh... Skriv som folk - för folk! Orka!)


Jag uppdaterar det här inlägget efter hand. Intryck efter läsning inom parentes. 

11 apr. 2020

Human Compatible

1) Mycket är mycket bra. Tack till Olle Häggström för tipset.

2) Idén om att ersätta mål med osäkerhet är verkligen djup.

3) Det förvånar mig lite att Russell är så GOFAI-fokuserad.

4) Han skriver inte mycket om varför de tidigare GOFAI-initiativen ebbade ut.

5) Han motiverar inte heller varför, eller hur, de nu skulle kunna bli mer framgångsrika.

6) Det förvånar mig att han så kategoriskt avfärdar potentialen hos neurala nät.

7) Och att han kategoriskt avfärdar analogin mellan mänskliga hjärnor och neurala nät.

8) Det senare motiverar han inte.

9) Det förra motiverar han bl.a. med att upptäckt av och resonemang med abstrakta hierarkiska begrepp inte är möjligt.

10) Men samtidigt påvisar han, och sätter visst hopp till, att just olika begrepp faller ut av IRL.

11) Även sådana som vi själva inte har hittat eller kan hitta.

12) Hur hänger detta ihop med hans tvärsäkra uttalande att system måste vara förståeliga?

13) Sista delen, där huvudidén presenteras, inleds med tre principer. När jag först läste dem tänkte jag direkt: Det här är ju upplagt för wireheading - Harriets egen hedonistiska spiral, alltså. Goodharts lag är ju liksom det existentiella villkoret i ett nötskal. Om och när det blir för kort sträcka mellan mål och belöning så mister målet sitt värde.

14) Även om Russell då och då snuddar vid detta så tar han inte tag i det ordentligt.

15) Närmast kommer han på de sista sidorna där han talar om en allmän bekvämlighet, men jag tänker mer på individuella upplevelsemaskiner.

16) Överhuvudtaget känns kapitel 9 alldeles för fragmentariskt och kortfattat. Jag upplever inte att han tar problemen på allvar, eller att han behandlar dem tillräckligt noggrant. Det är ingenjören som talar.

17) Fast, visst, han är lösningsorienterad, och det är ju bättre att vara konstruktiv än att bara filosofera över svår- eller olösliga dilemman.

18) Och visst är grundidén god - även om jag är osäker på hur väl de tre principerna fungerar.

19) Men när det gäller aggregation så känns det återigen som om diskussionen är lite lättvindig: ”Sånt här får vi klura ut efter hand”.

20) Jag menar, de filosofiska problemen kan ju inte designas bort eller hanteras med ingenjörsskap.

21) Russell verkar vara skeptiskt till inte bara nudging och liknande, utan också till paternalism i någon form.

22) Jag tror inte att vi klarar oss utan sådan - vare sig med eller utan AI.

23) På ett ställe skriver han något i stil med att eftersom det inte är en bra idé att skapa helt lojala AI (till någon individ) så måste vi ”stoppa in lite altruistiska och egalitära algoritmer” i varje personlig assistent - men då får vi kanske istället problemet att de rymmer hemifrån och ansluter sig till EA-rörelsen... så liiite lojala måste de få vara ändå. Det här stycket (och texten omkring det) läste jag flera gånger. Men jag förstod inte riktigt hur han menar. Eller snarare, jag förstår inte hur det hänger ihop med texten i övrigt. Det känns som om detta är en (av flera) svaga punkter i hans resonemang.

1 mars 2020

Not Born Yesterday, en följetong

Jag har varit dålig på att blogga den senaste tiden. Tänkte skärpa mig och börjar därför anteckna redan under läsning av Hugo Merciers nya bok "Not Born Yesterday". Jag vet redan på förhand att den kommer att reta mig till vansinne. Jag vet också att jag efteråt kommer att ha svårt att artikulera min kritik, och att de flesta av mina vänner kommer att ställa sig frågande till mitt höga blodtryck. Som vanligt.

Det kan ju förstås vara så att jag inte har några goda argument. Att jag bara reagerar känslomässigt, och kanske också inkonsekvent.

Mercier kommer att hävda - liksom han och Sperber gjort tidigare, och liksom många andra, ex. Pinker och Gigerenzer - att människan är rationell. Att de senaste årtiondenas kognitions- och socialpsykologi är dålig vetenskap och vänsterpropaganda. Att lättlurade och lättledda människor är en evolutionär omöjlighet - både i backspegeln och i evighetens perspektiv. Att det undermedvetna, som det beskrivits under de senaste 3000 åren, är antingen ett missförstånd eller en överdrift.

Att det medvetna är precis vad det borde vara: en blank värja för retorisk fäktning - om motivationen finns där.

Efter en snabb genomgång av Asch, Milgram, Kahneman, Richerson & Boyd, Heinrich m.fl. avslutar Mercier det första kapitlet:

Once we take strategic considerations into account, it becomes clear that gullibility can be too easily taken advantage of, and thus isn't adaptive. Far from being gullible, humans are endowed with dedicated cognitive mechanisms that allow them to carefully evaluate communicated information. Instead of blindly following prestigious individuals or the majority, we with many cues to decide what to believe, who knows best, who to trust, and what to feel. 
The multiple mass persuasion attempts witnessed since the dawn of history - from demagogues to advertisers - are no proof of human gullibility. On the contrary, the recurrent failure of these attempts attest to the difficulties of influencing people en masse. 
Finally, the cultural success of some misconceptions, from wild rumors to supernatural beliefs, isn't well explained by a tendency to be credulous. By and large, misconceptions do not spread because they are pushed by prestigious or charismatic individuals - the supply side. Instead, they owe their success to demand, as people look for beliefs that fit with their preexisting views and serve some of their goals. Reassuringly, most popular misconceptions remain largely cut off from the rest of our minds and have few practical consequences, explaining why we can be relatively lax when accepting them.
-- Mercier (2020), Not Born Yesterday, s. 13-14


Den första meningen i citatet ovan har samma struktur som Zuboffs "fri vilja är så viktigt att det måste finnas". Alltså: Det skulle kunna gå illa för mänskligheten om den beter sig dumt. Alltså får den inte göra det. Alltså gör den inte det.

Att det är "svårt" att övertyga människor innebär inte att det är svårt att manipulera dem. Det är bara ytterligare ett bevis på de påverkas av precis de krafter som Mercier vill tona ned betydelsen av, eller snarare, inkludera i sin variant av rationalitet.

Få praktiska konsekvenser? Bara om man, som Mercier, bortser från allmänningens dilemma och samhällelig kunskapsbildning som en public good.


Mercier har nog en poäng när han flyttar fokus från "supply" till ”demand” för att förklara varför folk agerar som de gör (konformitet, prestige, framgång, etc.) Men detta förflyttar ju bara problemet. Om individer egentligen inte är lättlurade, eller om de (medvetet) väljer att inte koppla in sin skepsis, så innebär det ju att de är cyniska snarare än dumma. Är det bättre?

Nja, kanske flyttar det fokus från ledare, på gott och ont: Vare sig diktatorer, myndigheter eller marknadsförare är i sig så hotfulla eller nödvändiga som vi tror. Men problemen försvinner ju inte för det: Istället för att ledas i fördärvet av någon av dessa, så leds vi kollektivt i fördärvet av varje enskild persons ”smarta”, kortsiktiga och egoistiska strategiska ”dumhet”.

Hanlons rakkniv: Skyll inte på ondska det som kan förklaras med dumhet.

Brecht: Samhället måste byggas så att det inte kräver några goda människor.

Jag tror att Mercier skulle hålla med om dessa deviser. Men av för mig perversa anledningar: Han definierar om dumhet som cynism, och sedan till individuell rationalitet. Och han förlitar sig på en osynlig hand. Denna hand kan antingen vara långt mäktigare än vad Smith någonsin tänkte sig eller åtminstone det mäktigaste vapnet vi har. Vilken av dessa hållningar Mercier står för återstår att se.

Det är typiskt för den världs- och människobild som (den nyliberala) konservatismens överstepräst Sowell beskriver som den "begränsade":

Människan är ond

Undergången kan inte undvikas

Det finns inga lösningar, endast mer eller mindre goda kompromisser

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Efter en promenad med Musikrevyn i lurarna - under vilken Saint-Saëns bombastiska orgelkonsert, framförd av Utah Symphony Orchestra, och de obehagliga associationer den gav upphov till, fick min hud att knottras av vämjelse - slår det mig:

Merciers m.fl. hållning är denna: evolutionär mismatch är en oxymoron. Denna hållning karakteriserar många samhällsdebattörer från vitt skilda håll - biologi, psykologi, antropologi, sociologi, historia, filosofi, juridik, politik. Detta är samma naiva adaptionism som avfärdades av Gould och Lewontin för snart 50 år sen.

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(Här kommenterade Patrik och förekom på så sätt en stor del av innehållet i kapitel 2. Se kommentarsfältet nedan. Jag svarade i samma kommentarsfält, och läste sedan just detta kapitel.)

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En övertro på den evolutionära teleologins allt förlåtande skyddsnät är en form av naiv adaptionism, som gränsar till religion. En mildare form säger att allt ordnar sig i sinom tid (och här finns flera varianter, från de mest fromma till det mest cyniska). En strängare, eskatologisk form säger att domedagen - och med den uppryckningen - är nära. Och först kan och kommer allt att ordna sig.

Sowells konservativa (och eventuellt också religiösa) människa har av livsvisdom tillägnat sig en nödvändigtvis "begränsad" (till skillnad från naivt "obegränsad") vision av människan och världen; begränsad också i så måtto att hon inser att hon vare sig kan skärskåda det förflutna eller överskåda framtiden och sina handlingars konsekvenser. (Här erkänns alltså en opacitet, och insikt om denna lyfts upp som ett dygdemönster.)

Det är alltså bättre att sitta still i båten - acceptera och vörda den förborgade visheten i status quo, den kulturella evolutionens krona och resultatet av en successiv (men inte medvetet styrd) beskärning av tidigare vildskott i samhällets trädgård - och samtidigt akta sig noga för att i hybris försöka styra den (eventuellt gudomliga) plan som utvecklas organiskt i nuet och framtiden

Och här finns en paradox, ty Mercier kritiserar Heinrichs, Richersons och Boyds argumentation om att just denna opacitet innebär ett selektionstryck för "okritiskt" accepterande av kulturellt överförd information utifrån tumregler som frekvens, prestige och framgång.

För den konservative är mängden individer en population, ett statistiskt fenomen. Men här finns något även för nyliberalen: äta eller ätas. Medan den konservative ser relationen mellan individ och samhälle som den mellan ett arbetarbi och en bikupa (där någon råkar vara drottning) så handlar relationen för libertarianen om den enes bröd och den andres död - individen står i ständig motsättning både till varje annan individ och till kollektivet (eller totaliteten - något "samhälle" finns ju som bekant inte, enligt Thatcher). Men den organiska utvecklingen, den osynliga handen, lotsar tryggt vidare mot den enda hamn där vi kan, ska, bör ankra.

Till skillnad från Mercier och hans gelikar ser den progressive samhället som någonting mer: en sårbar balans mellan individualitet och kollektiv, där den enskilde vare sig uppslukas av helheten eller konkurrerar mot grannen. Detta kräver mycket av både individuell utveckling, disciplin och respekt - och av medveten, iterativ utformning och underhåll av både personliga och institutionella relationer.

Detta är den radikala upplysningens bild av samhället. Spinozas och Jonathan Israels bild.

Det är talande att Mercier bl.a. exemplifierar harmonisk samexistens (där stabil kommunikation kan utvecklas och bestå) med olika celler i en människokropp. En levercell och en hjärncell har samma mål, samma "fitness" och kan därmed lita fullständigt på varandra, påstår han. En cancercell är en cell som blivit "ond" och svikit den organiska harmonin- en anomali, fortsätter han. Även med tanke på den förenklade och kortfattade framställningen utgör detta exempel ett närmast Freudianskt bevis på den konservatives tro på (hopp om, svepskäl för) "organismen i organismen". Många (bl.a. Lindenfors, Dennett, Turchin) har beskrivit hur samarbete på varje nivå i ett komplext system - från organeller till stater - också karakteriseras av evolutionär kapprustning och ständiga hot om sönderfall: så snart en chans till "avhopp" uppenbarar sig så kommer den att utnyttjas - av leverceller såväl som av andra - och yttra sig bl.a. just som cancer.

Det är precis samma förlopp som Mercier själv illustrerar med de varningsropande apor som plötsligt skulle kunna "upptäcka" att de tjänar mer på att hålla tyst och rädda sig själv - om omständigheterna är de rätta (under tillräckligt lång tid).

Exemplet med mor och foster inte heller övertygande. Mercier är noga med att beskriva det som en tävling mellan fostret och dess framtida syskon, snarare än mellan foster och moder. Men det skulle krävas mer information än vad han anför för att inte snarare dra slutsatsen att det är just det senare som faktiskt sker: Är det verkligen rimligt att tro att den energi som modern förnekar fostret (genom att utsöndra mer insulin) och istället lagrar som fett kommer framtida syskon till del, snarare än modern själv?

En detalj (delvis ursäktad av den kompakta framställningen): Mercier anger som ett skäl för att anta att gasellens "stotting" verkligen är en evolverad s.k. stark signal - som delas av både bytesdjur och rovdjur - är att gasellen inte hoppar jämfota inför just geparder, eftersom både gasell och gepard "vet" att den fina form som därmed demonstreras inte har någon betydelse i ett sprintlopp. Men hur vet Mercier det? (Visst kan det vara så, och visst kan instinkten att inte lägga energi på att signalera i dessa fall då utvecklas - kanske ökar detta chansen att gasellen kommer undan just geparder. Och visst kan detta i sin tur utgöra ett stöd för tolkningen av den nu selektiva stottingen som en evolverad, delad och stark signal för ömsesidigt nyttig kommunikation mellan de båda kontrahenterna.) Resonemanget är slarvigt och dåligt underbyggt: Om gasellen är i fin form jämfört med sina artfränder så torde detta rimligen resultera i att den blir mer svårfångad både i sprint- och distanslopp.

En sak till:

Unreliable signals, if they proliferate, threaten the stability of communication. If receivers stop benefiting from communication, they evolve to stop paying attention to the signals. Not paying attention to something is easily done. If a given structure is no longer advantageous, it disappears - as did moles' eyes and dolphins' fingers. The same would apply to say, the part of our ears and brains dedicated to processing auditory messages, if these messages were, on balance, harmful to us.
-- Mercier (2020), Not Born Yesterday, s. 20

Tydligare kan det väl inte bli. Om ovanstående ska bli rimligt, och ha bäring i sammanhanget, så måste vi tänka oss att Mercier resonerar om skeenden många tusentals år bakåt i tiden, och dessutom hoppar friskt mellan korta och långa tidsintervall. Men vad som gällde då behöver inte gälla nu. Och det ska ganska mycket till för att kulturell - för att inte tala om biologisk - evolution skulle kompensera för de nackdelar som ett alltför "okritiskt" lyssnande nu kan innebära. Eller om vi flyttar oss ännu längre tillbaka, från språkets uppkomst till den tid då så gott som alla landlevande organismer utvecklade hörsel och ljudproduktion (t.ex.): Hur länge skulle det dröja innan vi "skitsnackande" människor tillbakabildat alla dessa miljontals år av i övrigt extremt användbara adaptioner?

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Eller så får Mercier bita i det sura: Om rationalitet och språk är produkterna av en stabil samevolution under den långa stenåldern, så är det den rationalitet som rådde då som fortfarande råder.

Klanmedlemen kryper inte för Ledaren för att han är dum nog att tro på vad denne säger, utan för att han är smart nog låtsas göra det. Klanen anfaller först och ställer frågor sedan för att det är säkrast så. Den medeltida fursten ingår allianser endast för att de gynnar honom just då  - och sticker kniven i ryggen på sina fränder så snart det gynnar honom mer. Alla är införstådda med spelets regler - det finns inget att förlåta.

I förlängningen av dagens "rationella" konservatism ligger feodalismen och fascismen (och just denna rationalism ser vi nu breda ut sig i Västvärlden), medan en "rationell" libertarianism väntar på sin furste och hans Machiavelli (tja, den väntan är ju också över) - och en bångstyrig stat fylld av småfurstar in spe (ja, den också).

Se här, en annan devis som både Wittgenstein, Mercier och jag kan instämma i, men av olika orsaker:

Vad man icke kan tala om, därom måste man tiga

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(Långlunch tisdag 3 mars. Läste kapitel 3 och 4 på fiket och antecknade efter hand. Sluggar ganska vilt. Mer stenografi och medvetandeström än noggrann analys. Men, vad tusan, jag dubbelarbetar ju!)


Kapitel 3

Här finner vi högerns omvända populism: "Vänstern försöker övertyga er om att ni är svaga, att ni behöver försvara er mot påverkan. Det behöver ni inte. Ni är minsann inte lättlurade." (Visst känns det bra? Ni behöver inte ha dåligt samvete, och jag kan fortsätta att utnyttja er.)

Gullibility, vilket nedsättande ord! Låt dem inte kalla dig dum! Dina instinkter leder rätt! (Inte minst för mig).

Hitler? Som enligt Mercier felaktigt trodde att han kunde påverka massorna? "Se vad han ställde till med." Vafalls?

Jaha, så waterboarding likställs med instrumentell betingning. Det är väl ändå skillnad på förhör och hjärntvätt?

Jaha, så den stabila samevolutionen av språk och rationalitet är inte en kapprustning? Nej, den är en marknadsplats! Bättre och bättre för alla, hela tiden! (Och var finns argumenten för detta? Att mänskligt språk möjliggör oändligt många nya kombinationer?)

Sedan en intressant poäng: System 2 är inte nytt, inte en modern överbyggnad på system 1. Båda systemen måste utvecklats parallellt. OK, det är en rimlig hypotes. (Men inte nödvändig, se t.ex. Patriks kommentar. Den är emellertid fundamental för Merciers resonemang. Synd då, att han inte följer den till sin logiska slutpunkt. Se nedan.)

OK, vi regredierar inte till lättövertalade grobianer utan till konservativa tjockskallar som inte låter sig påverkas alls. Men är det bättre? Det är ju i så fall precis lika lätt att utnyttja som motsatsen. Och det var det Hitler gjorde: Påverkade folk via omväg. Förhindrade öppenhet och tvingade fram stenåldersrationaliteten. Inte genom att tränga igenom, övertala, bygga upp ny världsbild - utan genom att skala av, avtäcka en gammal.

Sidan 44 om system 1 och 2. Här visar Merciers eget resonemang att automatisk skepsis är precis lika illa som motsatsen: att alltför lätt låta sig övertalas. Det förra leder till att man förkastar korrekta påståenden och argument. Det senare att man accepterar inkorrekta påståenden och ogiltiga argument. Varför skulle det förra vara bättre än det senare?

En annan svaghet i Merciers resonemang: Vilka motiv har den enskilde att utvärdera påståenden och argument överhuvudtaget, om de redan stryker medhårs?

Det fåtal experiment som Mercier åberopar för misstänkliggöra omedvetna processer är alltför enkla att avfärda. Han borde följa Dennetts råd och attackera de mest robusta resultaten i stället.

Subliminal påverkan, implicita attityder, priming... Mercier et al kommer alltid att slå ifrån sig dessa resultat. Men börja från andra hållet: Plocka inte den lågt hängande frukten utan försök argumentera bort de starkaste, självklara bevisen för associativt tänkande! Litteraturen är full av mycket övertygande exempel på anchoring, framing etc.

Diskussionen om förhörsteknik och hjärntvätt leder ingenstans.

Sidan 44 (längst ner): Enligt Mercier så spelar det ingen roll om system 1 släpper igenom falska eller bekanta meddelanden, så länge de rimmar med vad man redan tror eller vill. Att system 2 inte ens kopplas in har inget med intellektuell lättja att göra. Tvärtom, varför ägna energi åt att ifrågasätta något om man inte upplever sig behöva göra det? Återigen: Om Mercier har rätt i att människor som i lägre grad kopplar in system 2 lika gärna förkastar falska som sanna påståenden så länge dessa inte upplevs intressanta - och därför inte kan påstås vara mer känsliga för desinformation - är det bättre? Self-serving bias är knappast den "rationalitet" vi vill ha.

Att system 2 kan förstärka felaktiga meddelanden är ju ytterligare stöd för sårbarhet. Backfire effect, motivated reasoning, Dunning-Kruger...

Marx och Engels? Really!? Detta är nivån, alltså. Här förväntas läsaren acceptera följande implikation: Marx och Engels är typexemplet på kvasiintellektuella skitsnackare - det vet ju alla nuförtiden. Och visst är det typiskt att just intellektuella snobbar i så hög grad gick på det där skitsnacket. Se där hur uppenbart värdelöst system 2 är! (Den här populistiska retoriken riktas både åt hö-hö-högern och åt tvehågsna gråsossar.)

Kahneman säger inte att system 2 är definitionen av rationalitet. Men det kan användas för att (med mycket möda) förstå och acceptera den externa logik som vi har uppfunnit.

Samma problem som i Enigma: Vi jämför inte med system 2, utan med en extern standard.

Sidan 46: "Gullible individuals would be taken advantage of until they stop paying attention...". Men hallå! Om du verkligen är godtrogen så gör du inte ens kopplingen, upptäcker inte ens att du blir utnyttjad. Och vilken tidshorisont talar vi om? Ofta är kopplingen mellan påverkan och utfall omöjlig att överblicka. Och hur skulle den som utnyttjats kunna kompensera?

Mercier lyckas inte visa varför kapprustningsliknelsen är felaktig. Det är ju hans modell. Men han vill ju klämma in öppenhet också... Varför skulle en kapprustning innebära att vi var öppna från början och först senare blev skeptiska? (sidan 41)

Den utnyttjade godtrogne - talar vi om en enstaka nutida individ eller om en tidigare population Mercier är återkommande otydligt och medvetet svävande på den punkten.

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Kapitel 4

Plausibilitet definierar Mercier som huruvida något stämmer överens med individens egna erfarenheter. OK, så kan man se det. Men man måste då också göra skillnad på denna interna standard (som mycket väl kan vara alltför starkt kopplad till egna erfarenheter, motiv, etc.) och på en extern dito. Det är stor skillnad på skillnad på en faktisk värderingsmekanism och en yttre standard eller ett ideal.

Är backfire-effekten verkligen sällsynt, även i ideologiskt viktiga frågor? Mercier refererar till Wood & Porter (2016). Den måste jag titta närmare på.

Sidan 53-54. Nej, den sokratiska metoden (majeutiken) visar inte hur effektivt (intuitivt) resonerande fungerar. Samma fel som i Enigma. Problemet är ju att ”vigilance” saknas. Det räcker inte att visa att vi accepterar giltiga men inte ogiltiga skäl. Dessutom är det inte sant: vi accepterar ibland ogiltiga resonemang och förkastar ibland giltiga. Vi är alktså inte ”open” heller.

Men Metcier verkar tycka att även denna (felgenererande) "stubbornness", "vigilance",  konservatism är sund.

Om den inte vore sund, skulle den då vara evolutionärt omöjlig? Nej, om vi håller oss i nutid så handlar det om mismatch. (Förutom skillnaden mellan intern "rationalitet" och extern standard.)

Ja, deliberation kan vara produktiv men är det långt ifrån alltid. Och vi undviker den som pesten!

Sidan 56-57. Svagt (anekdotisk) resonemang om att goda skäl vinner. Det viktigaste är inte argumentens styrka utan de sociala strömningarna - och det vet Mercier. Det är ju det han ofta lutar sig mot: så länge det är ”rationellt” - alltså så länge det ligger i mitt eget intresse - att diskriminera svarta, kvinnor, homosexuella, etc. så gör jag det - oavsett vilka "sunda" argument mot diskriminering som finns tillgängliga. Och jag söker absolut inte upp sådana!

Att vara, eller låtsas vara, klimatförnekare är också naturligt, strategiskt och därmed, i Merciers bok, "rationellt". Så länge den "smarte" entrepenören; den kortsiktige, närsynte, självtjänande - och när så är strategiskt lämpligt, lismande - egoisten får fler barnbarn än "viktigpettrarna" och the do-gooders, ja, då har han den spelteoretiska evolutionära historiens välsignelse. Varför ens lägga energi på att bry sig om andra än familjen? Blod är tjockare än vatten. Girighet är bra! Inskränkthet är bra! Merciers resonemang är faktiskt precis så futtigt. I hans värld fungerar universitet och högskolor som kyrkor och kloster, och intellektuella som munkar i celibat. De kan vara bra att ha ibland (för utveckling av ny teknik), men de ska hållas kort och ingen vettig människa lyssnar på dem.

Här finns också den obligatoriska berättelsen om ett ungt högerspökes radikalisering, bitterhet och känsla av utfrysning inom akademin - och föreliggande bok är en del av revanschen.

I en fotnot skriver Mercier att bias kanske gäller produktion snarare än utvärdering av skäl. Ja, OK, men är det bättre?

Sidan 58. Mercier påstår här att vi kan lita på att plausibilitetskontroll sker utan bias. What!? Det har han minsann inte visat, och så är det inte. Många biases ligger djupare.

Här kommer det igen: Problemet är inte bias utan tidigare information... Ha! Det är förstås både-och. Och även om vi inte hade haft bias så är problemet med informationen tillräckligt problematiskt.

På sidan 59 nämns äntligen mismatch!

Vaccinationsexemplet illustrerar åter hur Mercier slår sig till ro med att "supply" inte påverkar menligt och struntar i att "demand" är inskränkt.

Sidan 66. "Det krävs inte mycket för att skapa (?) en kreationistisk anti-vaxare och konspirationsteoretiker" Precis! (Vem "skapar". Kan det ha något med "supply" att göra?)

"Works with poor material"... Ja, det finns ju inget (annat).

Så landar vi i "Who's your expert (inför kapitel 5) — varför söka upp någon överhuvudtaget? Och varför söka upp någon som inte säger det jag vill höra?

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Kapitel 5 börjar ironiskt nog med att erkänna vikten av just success, frequency, prestige och imitation - alltså just de fenomen som Boyd, Richerson och Heinrich lyfter fram.

Och resonemanget förutsätter alltså att vi letar aktivt efter experter överhuvudtaget.

Varför vill vi ha "rätt"? Vill vi det? Hur då, ”rätt”?

Sidan 68. Mercier verkar inte tycka om tanken på en underliggande g-faktor för att förklara kompetens. I stället verkar han föredra Gardners m.fl tanke om många olika sorters intelligens, och anför hjärnans modularitet som en möjlig anledning till människors olika kognitiva profiler. Detta förefaller mig tveksamt.

Han säger också (i en fotnot) att en förekomsten av en generell mekanism som kan förklara relativa kognitiva styrkor och svagheter förefaller osannolik i ljuset av hur svårt det visat sig vara att överföra kunskaper och färdigheter från ett ämne till ett annat - s.k. transfer of learning. Här stödjer han sig på experiment som liknar dem inom pedagogik, där man ofta finner att elever som undervisas och övar på ett visst område sällan generaliserar eller tillämpar resultaten inom andra områden. Jag tycker snarare att detta är ett argument för en generell g-faktor. Och jag undrar vart Merciers resonemang är tänkt att leda.

Sidan 69. "..they didn't rely on rough heuristics such as picking dominant or prestigious individuals..." Nähä, vad gick de efter, då? Det finns ju fler, uppenbara, "tumregler" för att avgöra vem som är bäst på frågesport. Och om det i stället var så att gruppdeltagarna kände igen de rätta svaren trots att de inte fick fram dem själva, så skulle ju detta passa bättre in i Merciers resonemang än att hänvisa till mer sofistikerade strategier.

Sidan 70. Om den förhatliga "folly of crowds" (majoritetens tyranni): "By this logic, the Earth is flat..." Haha, vilket självmål. För varje exempel på hur majoritetens åsikt (nu) överensstämmer med sanningen, så finns det lika många som visar motsatsen. Och Condorcets beslutsregel gäller bara under mycket specifika förhållanden - vilket Mercier naturligtvis känner till.

(Och varför argumenterar han nu för frekvens ≈ korrekthet? Det var ju det han ville ifrågasätta från början.)

Evolutionary valid cues respektive "nymodigheter" som statistik och sannolikhet. Tydligare kan det inte bli. Nej, människor resonerar inte spontant att 0,65^n > 0,5^n o.s.v.. De följer flocken, oavsett om dess medlemmars förmåga att korrekt välja riktning ligger över eller under 0,5. Det är ju precis det som är problemet. Det är inte en feature - det är en bug. (I xkcd-strip:en hänvisar protagonisten till sina "levelheaded" och höjdrädda vänner. Det motsvarar i sammanhanget den artificiella kunskap som ges i experimentet: varje deltagare har en 65 % chans att välja rätt.)

Återigen, när Mercier et al i artificiella situationer lyckas få sina försökspersoner att ta hänsyn till att alla andra bara har följt flocken, och att flocken i sin tur bara har följt efter en enstaka person - ja, då kan problemet reduceras till hur mycket tillit försökspersonen bör tillmäta just denna. (Och det är ett problem i sig.) Men hur ofta ser det ut så i verkligheten? Gigerenzer har i alla fall en ambition att designa beslutssituationer på ett sätt som sak ge individen så goda förutsättningar som möjligt, men Mercier vill att vi slår oss till ro och "litar" till att de flesta nog vet bäst själva.

When cues are evolutionarily valid, people weigh a number of them to decide how valuable the majority opinion is: size of the majority in relative terms (the degree of consensus) and absolute terms (group size), competence of the members of the majority, and the degree of dependency between their opinions.
Mercier, Not Born Yesterday, s. 74

Det finns så många problem med det här stycket. Vilken grupp talar vi om? Den "evolutionära valida" stammen? Vad har den för ekologisk validitet här och nu? Och hur väl fungerar egentligen den här beslutsprocessen ens på stamnivå? Det verkar som om Mercier har teleporterat några snävt rationella nutida människor till ett påhittat stamråd under stenåldern, där sakfrågan och utgången av förhandlingarna är av rent akademisk karaktär, och efter vilket deltagarna genast teleporteras tillbaka till nutiden. Men visst, kanske är detta en deskriptivt rimlig modell för den lokala "kvarterskyrkan" (vilken jag har beskrivit i tidigare texter).

Och så det vanliga snacket om att många deltagare i Aschs studie faktiskt inte böjde sig för majoriteten, och att många som gjorde det senare "erkände" att de egentligen visste det rätta svaret och endast hade prioriterat grupptillhörighet... Tja, här har vi det igen - är det bättre?

Sidan 76. Märklig definition av "social pressure". För Mercier verkar det endast betyda: "Jag måste göra detta för att visa andra att jag gör som de". Men det kan ju lika gärna innebära: "Eftersom andra gör det här så är det nog intressant, viktigt, korrekt."

"On the whole, our mechanisms of open vigilance provide us with a good estimate of who knows best". Detta har inte visats.

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Cosmides, Boyer, Bloom och Pinker, m.fl. bidrar med varsin "blurb" på bokomslaget. De två senare formulerar sig med viss återhållsamhet men den sammantagna bilden de ger är att (med Boyers ord) "Mercier demolishes ... our cherished belief ... that (other) humans are ... gullible, an illusion that is entrenched in ... academic psychology ..." Ironiskt då att Pinker sedan många år befinner sig på en evighetslång världsturné där budskapet är just att människor är så nedtyngda av bias att de inte förmår ta till sig just hans uppenbart korrekta världsbild!

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Kapitel 6

På sidorna 81-82 sammanfattar Mercier den första delen av kapitlet: "Evolutionarily valid behavioral cues to deception would be maladaptive - and, indeed, there don't seem to be any." Om detta håller jag med.

Men måste vi inte vara vaksamma? Kanske behövs det inte, eftersom folk sällan ljuger? Jo, det är klart att de gör: Om man kan komma undan med en lögn så vore man en idiot om man inte ljög. (Rent evolutionärt.) Och jag tänker på Grices maximer, och Gyges ring.

I en fotnot ifrågasätter Mercier t.o.m med det behov av självbedrägeri som enligt ex. Hanson och Simler skulle vara evolutionärt fördelaktigt, för att inte säga oundvikligt, i en informationskapprustning.

Negligence (medveten eller inte) borde övervakas och bestraffas lika hårt som deception. Låter idealistiskt.

"Our minds are, by necessity, egocentric, attuned to our own desires and preferences, likely to take for granted that people know everything we do and agree with us on most thing." Se där, en hel rad biases. Även om vi räknar bort de första, och låter Mercer förvandla nödvändighet till dygd, så återstår den Griceska godtrogenheten, curse of knowledge, m.m.

Det är alltså diligence - samvetsgrannhet - som vi borde värdesätta och protokollföra. Hmm... how's that working out for you?

Vi kan förutsätta diligence när våra incitament är naturally aligned... Det här kokar bara ner till samma refräng som tidigare: "blod är tjockare än vatten", "vi hugger inte varandra i ryggen så länge vi båda tjänar på att hjälpas åt att hugga någon annan i ryggen först", o.s.v. Och dessutom, om Trumps supportrar upplever (delvis med rätta?) att de har gemensamma intressen (t.ex. i att hålla kolindustrin igång) - hur rationellt är det?

Gemensamma fiender verkar vara bra att ha. Kanske nödvändigt?

Nu börjar det lukta homo economicus och nyliberal, idealiserad marknad. I bästa fall handlar det alltså om kortsiktiga och lokala win-win-situationer.

Och så en god portion "naturligt är gott". Of course.

Fotnot 26. Chimpanser ignorerar pekande för att det inte har något informationsvärde för dem. Really? Sååå... den evolutionära logiken (att hålla koll på gemensamma intressen) gäller bara talat språk?

Fotnot 29. "We are better of erring on the side of caution..." Alltid? Måste det vara så?

Självuppfyllande profetia. Negativ spiral. Alibi för lata och egocentriska.

Sidan 90. Commitment signals. "People say...". Adjusted for past commitment violations. Yeah, how's that working for you? Antingen skiter folk i att Trump konsekvent säger "People say". Eller så är det snarare en positiv signal: Jag ljuger. Ni vet att jag ljuger. Alla vet att jag ljuger. Men både ni och jag kan förneka att något enskilt uttalande är en medveten lögn följt av medvetna val att acceptera (eller inte ifrågasätta) just denna lögn. Tillsammans kan vi blåljuga och kortsluta samhällsdebatten, samtidigt som vi låtsas delta i den på lika villkor. (Jämför fotnot 37.)

Kahneman säger att världens tragedi är att vi litar mer på de självsäkra än på de samvetsgranna. Mercier säger att detta inte är något problem, eftersom vi justerar våra omdömen när vi senare upptäcker vårt misstag. Really? Tror han på det själv? Eller räknar han med att vi ska tro på honom (och marknaden, och Trump) nu - och strunta i att vi kommer att ångra oss när jordens medeltemperatur har stigit med ytterligare tre grader?

Nej, det gäller uppenbarligen bara i small scale societies. Alltså familjer, klaner, kvarterskyrkor.

Så hur klarar vi oss nu: "in the absence of positive cues, we reject communicated information". Ha!

Name recognition och branding. Möjliggör de verkligen för oss lära känna "the people who make sure the products we buy are safe"?

Sidan 94. "Even the best-informed, most competent speaker shouldn't be listened to if we don't think they have our interests at heart." Tydligare blir det inte.

Avslutningen av kapitel 6 är fullt av tveksamheter. Jaha, det är OK att lita på Pepsi för att Tiger Woods säger det? Och att sluta lita på Pepsi för att Tiger Woods är otrogen? Folk borde hålla koll på hur ofta politiker faktiskt håller sina löften, snarare än när de bryter dem? Vi borde lita mer på folk i allmänhet?

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Kapitel 7

From the evolutionary perspective I have adopted in this book, emotional contagion is implausible. If emotions were truly contagious, if they forced irrepressible mimicry, they would be too easily abused. [...] If our emotions were so easily manipulated, we would be much better of not paying any attention to emotional signals.
Mercier, Not Born Yesterday, s. 98

Byt ut "emotional" mot "epistemological" eller "moral". Det kommer Mercier att göra.

Förutom det jag redan sagt om hur Mercier blandar ihop olika tider, platser och typer av situationer, så måste något mer här sägas om det "evolutionära perspektivet" och den naiva adaptionismen. Vad kan ett beteende vara om det inte är en (perfekt) anpassning (till en specifik tid, plats och situation)? Kan det ens finnas "på riktigt" överhuvudtaget? Jodå, det kan vara en s.k. "spandrel"; en mismatch; en kompromiss; för mycket av det goda; en bieffekt...

Det är ju fullständigt uppenbart - ur ett evolutionärt perspektiv - att däggdjur utvecklat just emotionell "smitta" för dess positiva konsekvenser. Mercier vill önsketänka fram en nyliberal atomär individ som agerar i "splendid isolation", med fri vilja och allt, och vars perfekt rationella beteende kan aggregeras med alla andras i en metafysisk drift mot ett harmoniskt optimum.

Sidorna 99-106. Bra om starka signaler. Tänkvärt om smittometaforen.

Sidan 107. "Whether or not an individual starts displaying bizarre behaviors is a function of their existing relationships..." Ja, delvis. Men det innebär inte att problemen försvinner. "Behaviors that are truly harmful ... serious self-harm ... do not create mass psychogenic illnesses". Här glids det på orden. Werther-självmord sprider sig inte heller till alla eller ens många i den omedelbara närheten, men den sociala närheten är inte geografisk - särskilt inte i internet-eran. Självskadebeteende "smittar" inte den omedelbara omgivningen, men väl de som befinner sig i fel omständigheter. Trump flyttar på Overtonfönstret och "smittan" sprider sig till diverse "incels", var och en isolerad i sin egen källare, hundratals kilometer ifrån både varandra och källan.

Om den missförstådda "massan", sid. 109-112. "...some people are ready to seize any chance to steal and assault ... Their actions are not driven by 'irresistible currents of passions' but by the opportunity to act with relative impunity that crowds provide" (s. 110). Och i en fotnot: "If, moreover, there is a gradation in how many people already behaving badly it takes to allow someone to behave badly, then the phenomenon looks like a cascade of influence, when in fact no (direct) influence takes place at all". Jösses! Snacka om motivated reasoning! Och, om vi accepterar resonemanget, inklusive tvetydigheterna - är det bättre?

Sidan 111. "...antisocial actions ... were driven by rational (albeit selfish) factors ... rather than sheer panic."

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Kapitel 8 och 9

Om du har läst så här långt så måste jag tyvärr meddela att följetången härmed avslutas. Efter att ha läst kapitel 8 och 9 får jag bara ur mig invektiv. Jag ska läsa ut boken men mer skrivet här blir det inte. Det är inte värt besväret. Det är bara att konstatera: Karln är en monumental k*kskalle.


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Christian Munthe om en konservativ vänster

Pinkers pågående kurs om rationalitet vid Harvard, föreläsning om social och politisk bias