Frankfurtskolan och konstruktivism

Lyssnar till Bildningspodden om Frankfurtskolan och känner som vanligt ett starkt släktskap, inte minst med Adorno.Men jag hör också frön till det som senare urartade till postmodernism i andras händer. Och jag återvänder till en tanke jag närt sedan jag tvangs genomgå en behörighetsgivande lärarpåbyggnadsutbildning:

En stor del av problemen i dagens skola och samhälle kan nog föras tillbaka på ett enda monumentalt kollektiv missgrepp inom den akademisk-pedagogiska världen; ständigt begånget under de senaste femtio åren; nämligen undlåtenheten och oförmågan att hålla isär och hantera två helt olika betydelser av ordet konstruktivism.

Den ena betydelsen är att all kunskap och förståelse skapas av och i den enskilde genom att med medveten ansträngning och (aktivt sökande av) återkoppling lägga till och förbinda olika intryck till allt större, vittomfattande och effektiva semantiska nätverk. Detta är den kognitionpsykologiska mekanism som är och måste vara självklart sann - men samtidigt den som så ofta undgåtts eller undvikits.

Den andra betydelsen är den perspektivistiska och, i förekommande fall, maktkritiska betydelsen: socialkonstruktivismen. I sin renaste form är även den självklart sann: Det finns ingen view-from-nowhere; alla intryck måste kategoriseras och filtreras, både medvetet och omedvetet. Vissa kategoriseringar är mer tvingande än andra. Vissa har, eller bör ges, företräde. Viss är godtyckliga, tillfälliga eller subjektivt motiverade.

Men den nidbild som växt fram - först som tragedi, sedan som fars - är en av lärande som fri, obunden och kravlös lek. Och när motreaktionen kommer, sent omsider - alltför sent - så verkar inte heller den hitta tillbaka till konstruktivism, i dess olika och verkligt konstruktiva bemärkelser.

Demokrati och miljöhot

”Demokratin måste pausas för att lösa klimatkrisen” (SvD, 8/11 -17)


Först en bekännelse: Jag har inte ens läst den ovan länkade artikeln (betalvägg). Jag har under dagen bara hört och läst lite om den, och som hastigast noterat några andra utspel och reaktioner i anslutning till den, i samband med det pågående klimatmötet i Bonn.

My bad.

Men vad som kanske kan betraktas som en principdiskussion hann jag med.


Commentator

I have a hard time thinking of a strategically more unwise public perception-move than being open about the sad fact that many climate activists chose to invest themselves in this area (rather than, say, restricting immigration) exactly because their preference for collectivist solutions attracted them to a policy issue where the only solutions are collectivist.

Now, we know that collectivism is eternally tempted by totalitarianism.

The philosopher of totalitarianism is Plato. What was Plato most afraid of? What was the most disgusting phenomenon he knew? Change. Vile, disgusting, corrupting, chaotic, uncontrolled change.

Some climate activists are so well attuned to Plato’s sentiments that they put that word into their alarmism: Climate change. I can hear them shudder at the word.

So it all fits pretty well. It’s a valid criticism of climate activists: A significant number of them may be primarily motivated by their totalitarian psychology, their being disgusted by change, their political opposition to the values of the liberal enlightenment.

The last thing we need, public perception-wise, is to prove those critics correct by being blasé about the core principles of liberal democracy.

(For the record, I am very concerned about climate change, and have some sympathy for collectivism.)


Me

As to your first comment, I am skeptical of both its veracity and its argumentative value.

Collectivism, per se, is not plagued by totalitarian pull. However, controlled collectivism is. But there are equally many and dangerous pulls in other isms - and those dangers are very clear and very present right now.

Sure, Plato didn't like change, but - as with your first comment, this in itself isn't really a convincing argument against collectivism (controlled or not). He was also, and foremost, concerned with maximum overall welfare.

There is nothing wrong, or suspect, about being afraid of climate change. Quite the opposite.

A valid criticism would state that, since climate activists are primarily motivated by fear or disgust (which needs to be supported) they misrepresent the problem (to be supported) and (therefore?) suggest detrimental (in relation to what?) actions.

Liberal democracy, by the way, is not an altogether clearcut concept. To pretend that it stands for one, universally agreed upon thing, and that that thing is accepted as the (best) version or definition (*), is misleading. Give me your favorite definition, and I am pretty sure I will find several ways to interpret it in practice.

Just to put things at their most extreme: Even if some proclamation of a state of emergency requires us to depart from any reasonable interpretation of "liberal democracy", that in itself doesn't automatically rule out considering it.

And, as always, I can always turn the tables on the whole discussion by claiming that it is (only) fear of control in any form whatsoever that drive "climate skeptics". (And we know that there are ample correlations to be found there as well.)

Oh, and one more thing: There is a lot more to enlightenment than liberalism.

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(*) or, for that matter, that we are currently implementing that version

Inte så smarta som de tror

Lisa Magnusson: "Humanisterna" är inte ens hälften så smarta som de tror (Metro, 8/11 -17)


Den här artikeln har redan blivit rundligen och rätteligen kritiserad på allehanda håll, inte minst av faktiska Humanister.

Jag känner mig inte motiverad att upprepa alla de uppenbara skäl till varför så är fallet, utan nöjer mig med att lägga till några tankar.

Det framgår aldrig av artikeln vad de s.k. humanisterna egentligen anklagas för. Texten avslutas abrupt, utan att något färdigt argument har framförts. (Men dessförinnan ett flertal halmgubbar och andra tveksamheter.)

Den allra mest välvilliga tolkningen av artikeln är denna: ”Människor som klandrar andra människor som söker sig till alternativmedicin för att vara irrationella, är arroganta.” (Undrar om författaren håller med.)

Även denna, alltför (*) välvilliga, tolkning kan ifrågasättas. Exempelvis kan man med rätta ifrågasätta, och tillrättavisa, dem som söker sig till alternativmedicin - utan att vara arrogant. Faktum är att sådana ifrågasättanden minst lika ofta görs av omtanke. Dessutom kan även den som faktiskt är, eller framstår som, arrogant ha gott uppsåt. Framför allt: Om man har rätt (eller har de bästa argumenten) så har man det även om man är arrogant.

Man kan fråga sig om de som söker sig till alternativmedicin (av olika slag) tjänar på att bemötas med förståelse (av olika grad), och vilka andra negativa konsekvenser detta i så fall kan få.

Och låt oss nu inte blanda bort korten: Skolmedicinen är inte perfekt; inte heller sjukvårdsapparaten; läkare bör i högre grad (ges möjlighet att) inta ett helhetsperspektiv på sina patienter; läkemedelsindustrin har ett delvis negativt inflytande. Visst! Men det är inte detta artikeln talar om.

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(*)

Antingen är artikeln medvetet skriven för att uppröra, eller så är författaren åtminstone själv medveten om bristerna i argumentationen men har av olika anledningar ändå valt att lämna den till publikation. I så fall medverkar författaren medvetet till en mycket allvarlig och negativ samhällspåverkan.

Alternativt förmår författaren inte frambringa ett klarare resonemang, och ser inte heller de svårartade bristerna i sin text - och notera nu noga att jag inte avser vare sig de faktapåståenden eller värderingar som presenteras, även om dessa naturligtvis också kan diskuteras, utan endast den rent formella framställningen. I så fall utgör artikeln ett ledsamt exempel på vad som är gångbart i dagens medieklimat.

Att misslyckas i skolan är katastrof

Specialläraren: ”Att misslyckas i skolan är katastrof” (Skolvärlden 8/11 -17)

Dåliga skolresultat är en jätteriskfaktor för allt, inte bara för psykisk ohälsa, utan även för exempelvis kriminalitet och drogmissbruk. Att misslyckas i skolan är katastrof, säger Birgitta Kimber.

Och DÄR gick vi från korrelation till (riktad) kausalitet. Så går det pedagoger bearbetar epidemiologisk data.

Lägg därtill det underförstådda budskapet att det bästa sättet att visa medmänsklighet, och att producera samhällsnytta, är att sätta högre betyg.

Och så den vanliga visan om att skolan ska göra allt för alla. Och att detta i sin tur innebär att ämneslärare ska göra allt.

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Det finns många fler nyanser här, men som extremt luttrad lärare må jag vara förlåten om jag gör några grova förenklingar och antaganden.

Jag kanske är ”trigger happy” men när pedagogen Kimber övertar ordet riskfaktor från den sakligt korrekta originalkällan så misstänker jag att hon omedvetet (eller i värsta fall medvetet, men den risken bedömer jag som liten) misstolkar den.

(Över huvud taget är jag kluven till detta språkbruk även inom akademin eftersom det erbjuder en lättvindig utväg för att undvika anklagelser om att felaktigt läsa in orsaksamband, samtidigt som det bibehåller lockelsen att likväl agera som om de funnes. Framför allt är det direkt oansvarigt att (låtsas) tro att allmänheten i sin tur kan hantera det.)

Och när samma pedagog sedan säger ”Att misslyckas i skolan är katastrof” så är risken stor att hon tror - eller vill få andra att tro - att det är just skolmisslyckandet som orsakar allt det andra.

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Jag behöver väl inte tillägga att det självklart kan innebära en katastrof för enskilda individer att (uppleva att de) misslyckas i skolan (vad nu det innebär).

Eller att det å andra sidan inte bör, eller måste, vara så. Eller att det inte alltid är så.

Vad detta innebär, eller bör innebära, för skolan (i någon mening) - ja, det är en annan sak.

Är AI en logisk omöjlighet - och spelar det någon roll?

Should we be afraid of AI? (AI is both logically possible and utterly implausible)


Daniel Dennett delade den här texten av Floridi på Twitter igår, med kommentaren ”Bullseye!”, och menade att den slår KO på singulariteten.

Bullseye! Floridi KOs the Singularity.
True AI is both logically possible and utterly implausible – https://t.co/9Ecp2z7pDa via @aeonmag

— Daniel Dennett (@danieldennett) 3 november 2017

Detta förvånar mig högeligen.

Floridi vill inte positionera sig som varken ”Singularist” eller ”AIteist”. Han medger att (stark) AI är en logisk möjlighet men menar att den i praktiken är högst orimlig och osannolik, och att vi därför borde ägna oss åt viktigare saker - som att hantera problemen med allt smartare (snabbare, större, mer kompetenta) datorer.

Det finns en logik i ovanstående. (Läs igen!) Och Floridi pekar ut många högst påtagliga problem som förvisso är värda större uppmärksamhet.

Men Floridi tror inte på det han själv skriver - att stark AI är en logisk möjlighet. Det säger han bara (på ett enda ställe) för att vinna trovärdighet. Han försöker på så sätt ställa sig vid sidan av (och över) de AIteister som, liksom Dreyfus och Searle m.fl., framstår som allt mer verklighetsfrånvända i sina vädjanden till mysticism.

Floridi beskriver dessa AIteister kärnfullt:

”AI is just computers, computers are just Turing Machines, Turing Machines are merely syntactic engines, and syntactic engines cannot think, cannot know, cannot be conscious. End of story.”

Och sedan kommer han ut som just en sådan AIteist!

Skälen han anför är inte raffinerade. Floridis tydligaste argument mot ”riktig” maskinell intelligens är de matematisk-logiska gränserna för beräkningsbarhet. Vilket förstås får vän av ordning att undra på vilket övernaturligt sätt dessa överskrids av mänskliga hjärnor.

Som om han redan glömt sitt avståndstagande från naiva AIteister beskriver han det verkliga problemet:

...technologies can replace us without having any understanding, mental states, intentions, interpretations, emotional states, semantic skills, consciousness, self-awareness or flexible intelligence.

Det är förunderligt hur Floridi kan missa hur gränsen mellan syntax och semantik ständigt har förskjutits under de senaste 60 årens filosofiska diskusioner om AI - inte minst som han själv sällar sig till ledet genom att bagatellisera Alpha Go.

OK, låt gå för Floridis antropocentriska högmod. Låt honom reservera ord som ”förståelse” etc. för oss människor. (Men då kan han inte längre hävda sin unika och upplysta position.) Vad innebär detta för hans eget resonemang, egentligen? Att vi inte borde oroa oss för att allt kraftfullare datorer på egen hand - med flit! - hittar på dumheter? Räcker det inte med alla de problem som Floridi faktiskt räknar upp, tillsammans med de illasinnade eller oöverlagda beslut som människor ingjuter i systemen? Eller innebär det att det hade varit mycket värre att en medveten AI ödelägger jorden än att en icke-medveten d:o gör det? Eller att endast en kännande AI skulle kunna hitta på något riktigt elakt?

Jag vet inte vad det är Dennett uppskattar i den här texten, som dessutom är (medvetet) otydlig. Troligen (det underförstådda) budskapet att även evolutionära algoritmer behöver mycket speciella omständigheter och tidsrymder för att ens närma sig något som motsvarar eller överträffar den mänskliga hjärnan. Även detta förvånar mig något - med tanke på att Dennetts hela karriär gått ut på att visa att detta är det enda rimliga sättet att förklara alla former av mentalt liv - men det är åtminstone en rimlig hållning.

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From the ensuing Facebook debate:


Me

I find it petty to brush aside AI and x-risk as irresponsible indulgences. The resources and attention it gets, and wants, is nothing compared to, e.g., the so called "debate" on climate change, environmental degradation, etc. It's hardly the case that we're so grown up as to prioritize the (only) right thing, at the right time, with the appropriate measures. Once (if) we get close, as a global society, then maybe we can start to make tougher priorities.

If Dennett and Floridi had said: Look, we've known for a hundred years that exploitative fossil-driven capitalism is bringing us towards environmental and social collapse. Let's do something about it, once and for all, and if we succeed, then let's move on to more "luxurious" worries. Then, maybe, I would have accepted the argument.


Thore

Why so certain? We all associate some very small probability ε > 0 to the event “Apocalyptic AI happens within a timeframe in which it makes sense to think about it.” We also all associate some very small probability δ > 0 to the event “x-riskers speculating about AI seriously hurts their credibility to the point of hurting climate change activism.”

We may differ on if ε < δ. But it’s a discussion about the relationship between two extremely ill-defined and ill-understood numbers, whose only commonality is that they are very small.

Of course, a different discussion can be had about A, the effect of apocalyptic AI, and C, the effect of climate change. Many people (but not all) would agree on A > C. (Of course, you could to discount that for proximity to the event to make it even more precise. But let me stop this exercise here.)

So is εA > δC or εA < δC? Serious rationalists must know the answer to this, because their moral certitude in their activism depends one this tradeoff. Get it wrong, and you’re responsible for the death. Of. Civilisation!

So, given the ingredients of (i) extreme uncertainty about ε, δ, and maybe A, and (ii) the deep moral repercussion of being wrong, we’d expect these debates to end in tribalism, name-calling, etc. We need to actively prevent ourselves and each other from that trap.


Me

Thore, I feel that there is something fishy about your argument; several things, actually, but I'm not sure I can pin them down (I suspect that at least one of them is connected to my understanding of what Olle refers to as vulgo-popperianism). I do appreciate your input and I find this discussion interesting. I hope you do too. So let's take another spin.

I think I can make a strong case for the following:

δ < τ; δ < μ; δ < ρ; δ < θ ...

...where τ, μ, ρ, θ etc. stand for any number of things - both actions/states and inactions/non-states - that are more detrimental to the mitigation of climate change than raising the problem of other x-risks.

I can definitely (with logical certainty) make the case that:

δ < Σ (τ, μ, ρ, θ, ...)

As regards moral certitude and "serious rationalism", I don't feel guilty about not being able to produce an ironclad proof that δ < ε. That kind of standard can only lead to inertia. Very rarely are there opportunities, in real life, to hold to such a standard. It would be more morally suspect of me not to act or speak out of my deepest concern.

(It would be great to live in a Leibnizian world where everyone agreed on the truth and the right course of action. History is a tug-of-war and I don't see the point of not participating.)

If I am to be held to such a standard, then everyone else should too. In that case, I could easily conjure up situations where my opponents would need to provide impossible certainties in order for me to validate their point of view - just by reframing the situation.

I could, for instance, present the number ɣ for the very small but non-zero possibility that you not eating your veggies everyday might bring us closer to catastrophe (environmental or whatever) and then insist that since you cannot know the value of ɣ you would be morally culpable to prioritize any other (unknown) quantity.

Logic aside, there is an informal fallacy being committed here, namely a false dichotomy.

Furthermore, Floridi himself would need to show that δ > ε in order to pass your test. He doesn't even argue for it! He doesn't even really argue for the fact that ε is small, or that δ is large.

And Floridi most certainly doesn't argue that τ, μ, ρ, θ, ... are small. To him, history is a blank slate, and current technological developments are all there is - to effect either good or bad.

But let's not forget: Even disregarding risks altogether; disregarding also the almost non-existent arguments for why we shouldn't be concerned with AI; Floridi's article is very poorly argued. First, he purports not to be an AItheist but then makes it abundantly clear that he is. Secondly, he naively thinks that consciousness (or whatever) is what would make a "super-intelligence" truly dangerous; more dangerous than the merely "smart" machines he does warn us about. Thirdly (which I already hinted above) he lazily reiterates dusty old quips to the effect that "of course" we cannot expect to find truly human-like qualities in any machine - relying on equally lazy readers' anthropocentric intuitions.


Thore

Hm… you must be able to at least loyally represent the arguments against Apocalyptic AI scenarios.

(I know at least two: (i) it makes us worry about the wrong thing regarding the very real dangers of nonfictional AI, and (ii) it taints the x-risk in the public eye, in particular by trivialising the importance of actual scientific evidence for climate change.)


You may discount these arguments. But they exist. The epistemological step from taking these arguments Very Seriously and taking Bostromian extrapolations Very Seriously is small, as far as I can see.


Me

To your first point: I agree that I should, and that those are valid arguments. I wish Floridi had put it like that!

Your second point I can also provisionally accept, in isolation.


But we still do not operate in a vacuum, where every other concern fades away. Again, if Floridi had listed a top-ten list of things, other than powerful computing, as major concerns not to be forgotten - and then just focused on the immediate danger of current computing technology (without even mentioning the singularity, or at least not his pet problems with it) - well, then he could have made a decent point.

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Meditations on meditations on Moloch

Meditations on Moloch


Spoiler: The whale carcass consists of oil.

Two conclusions:

The authoritarian philosopher-king looks like a pretty insignificant evil compared to most other alternatives. It is an irresponsible luxury to pretend anything else. And if not even he is capable of defending our garden-reservation, such as it may be, then all that is left to do is to transfer this responsibility to the super-human - but man-made - technological gardener who has the power to exterminate all the encroaching weed of the universe.


Bootstrap? I return to my reflections on Here Be Dragons:



What do we really want?

Or:

What do we want our future techno-selves to want?

Or:

What do we want our smarter-than-us (and possibly also wiser-than-us) AI to want?



If we ask it to find out what we really want, we will be sorry - for several reasons:

we don't know

we don't want to know

we can't agree (not even with ourselves); and

what we want isn't really what we want anyway.



So what if we instead ask the AI to find out what we (objectively) should want...

if there even is such a thing

if we are able to formulate the question

if we are able to understand the answer

if we are able to verify it

if we are able to comply

...well, then we will also be sorry, for that is surely not what we want.



So what do we want? We want to strive for, but not attain, any and all of the goals that could plausibly appear as candidate answers above. The journey is the goal.


We must get into the habit of restraining ourselves - and others. And to find satisfaction in doing so.


It is only in relation to boundaries that we may find meaning and harmony.


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My allegorical take on conservatism versus progressivism:


Oh, you intolerable upstart. This is exactly why we, the keepers of the arcane, can never entrust its secrets to you and your like. There are forces at work here that you will never fathom. Secrets revealed and manifested through generations, ingrained and fortified in the walls of our burgs and castles, and in our palaces.

I will grant you a boon, satiate your desire. I will do the unthinkable and tell you why what is hidden must remain hidden. Why it cannot and must not be revealed. I will let you glean the double-edged sword of true power. I will do that which no other will, and so further enhance your conviction and destructive potential.

In the end it will avail you naught.

You challenge the keepers to tell you what it is they know that you do not, and they tell you that your insistence is pointless. You suspect that their reluctance springs from ignorance and indifference rather than strength of character and a sense of a higher purpose. From the fear of narrow minds rather than noble ones.

And in this you are right! So there you have it - the one edge of the sword you so desperately seek to wield.

But even the most narrow-minded of keepers intuitively know and accept that the knowledge and power needed to wield the sword can never be articulated fully, nor mastered by any one man. And they know that failure to accept this is the most dangerous hubris of all. They also know that the pinnacle of self-control is to keep the sword sheathed, lest the temptation of using but the one edge, ever so sharp and alluring, ultimately brings destruction to all.

This knowledge is bound to the very walls of our castles and palaces. And we, as their guardians, are part of it.

You and your like will never see beyond the obvious. Not before every wall has crumbled and you are left with nothing but chaos and when in the ruins of an old world, the best you can hope for is to build a new world in its image. We will not allow your naïveté to set us all back.

But is it science?

But is it science?

Kommer att tänka på de första samtalen jag hade med min käre vän Martin när vi just hade träffat varandra.

Jag befinner mig i Williamsons läger och Martin - tror jag - i Scrutons. Då och då glimtar jag värdet i fenomenologiska och semantiskt ”slutna” förklaringsmodeller, men oftast finner jag dem högfärdiga och egocentriska. Jag säger inte att de är felaktiga eller irrelevanta, men när jag hör att de inte kan, eller inte bör, reduceras eller sättas in i ett större sammanhang - ja, då osäkrar jag min pickadoll.

The Surprising Revolt at the Most Liberal College in the Country

The Surprising Revolt at the Most Liberal College in the Country

Intressant. Det här är klurigt - det är så många faktorer som spelar in. Jättesvårt att få ”rätt” sammanhang och perspektiv.

Det första som slår mig är att detta handlar om klassiska socialpsykologiska mekanismer, vilka tar sig löjeväckande uttryck och får ovanligt stora konsekvenser.

Jag är också förvånad över hur amerikanska lärosäten uppenbarligen inte är professionella nog att hantera vad som i princip är samma desorienterade fjortisar som de alltid har haft att hantera.

Men det är förstås känsligt att, som liberal arts-bastion, slå ned kategoriskt på odisciplinerade elever - särskilt som hela vitsen med utbildningen är att förmedla insikt och empati i olika människors förhållanden och hur de upplever dem. Och dessutom mot en bakgrund av (institutionaliserad) rasism.

Nu verkar det, i mina ögon, som om ledningen har ”bent backwards” alldeles för mycket. Kanske blir den uppdaterade kursplanen alltför tillrättalagd. Framförallt skulle personalen ha kvävt de värsta dumheterna i sin linda: Hur f-n kan man acceptera att elever regelbundet stör undervisningen? Det är inget ”liberalt” med det.

Men två förbehåll:

1) Det kan vara så att - även om formerna är felaktiga och innehållet är överdrivet, egocentriskt och affektivt - det finns en kärna av ”sanning” i protesterna. Sett i ett vidare perspektiv kan man ex. tänka sig att det är en god sak att utöka kanon med icke-västerländska tankeströmningar och med distans till, och kritik av, de västerländska dito. Historiskt har de flesta förändringsrörelser uppfattats med misstro tills dess att normerna med eftersläpning har förändrats - ofta till det ”bättre”. Lite Hegel: tes, antites, syntes. Det kan också vara så att de ”välartade” studenter som nu reagerar delvis blir konformistisk gisslan.

2) Jag uppfattar det så att den ultra-rationella (och ibland inte fullt så rationella) högern använder sådana här pubertala disciplinära problem som alibi för att driva en agenda som vare sig är alltigenom godartat eller fullt uttalad. Genom att utnyttja situationen och överdriva åt andra hållet bidrar man till en eskalerande spiral av alltmer extrema positioner.

Det måste gå att hålla fler än en tanke i huvudet samtidigt. Och det måste gå att värna om sanning, kunskap, bildning o.s.v. och samtidigt vara öppen för olika idéer.

The baker is a prick - and that's his prerogative

During the introduction to their latest podcast on The Absurd, the Very Bad Wizards (Tamler Sommers and David Pizarro) discuss ethical dilemmas and "no-brainers". They observe that some dilemmas divide people into two (or more) camps of diametrically opposing views. People on both sides are not only convinced that they are right - but also that their view is obviously the only reasonable one to take.

To take just one example, some people find it obvious that teleportation kills you, and others find it equally obvious that it doesn't.

One current real-life (supreme court) case is that of a US baker who refused to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex couple. What he within his rights to do so? And what is the connection between this and the debate on free speech on campuses?

A lively debate soon sprung up on the Very Bad Wizards Facebook page. Most of the following has already been discussed there, but I would still like to express my opinion - and ask some naive but earnest questions.

I'm Swedish, and though I don't imagine myself representative of all Swedes, I think there may be some general cultural differences between Swedes (Europeans) and Americans.

The baker example struck me as a no-brainer. And the way it looks to me is this: The baker is a private business-owner, providing his services to make a livelihood. He is bound to operate within the same legal restrictions (e.g. environmental) as any other business, but other than that, he decides for himself who to serve, and how. If he doesn't want to serve certain people, or provide certain services (including services that might be "expected" of him) - that's his prerogative. If, by denying certain services to certain people, he acquires a bad reputation in some circles, well, that's his loss, and probably his own calculated cost-benefit.

As long as the baker is consistent, and up-front about his own rules. And as long as those rules don't violate any general laws.

Laws against discrimination are one thing: they say that if a baker does bake certain cakes for one category of people, then he should do so for any other category of people as well. There are reasons for this general law, since racism etc. is a real problem. But, to make things extreme, if the baker randomly denies some people some things (just because he's a prick) then that should be up to him.

From another perspective, I find it unreasonable for a customer who is denied a specific service to litigate if the baker doesn't provide that service to anyone else. It's like saying that if IKEA doesn't carry a special kind of sofa that I would like (and that another company does carry) then they are obliged to make one especially for me - otherwise I feel discriminated against.

Now, to free speech and campuses.

In Sweden, all higher education is public and tuition-free. Very, very rarely are there any cases of controversial speakers. Universities seldom invite speakers other than for purely academic reasons. Student bodies don't invite speakers to campus at all. (Possibly to their own clubs, but these are separate from the university.) Overall, there is an instinctual culture of separating academia and politics as much as possible.

When I listen to discussions about free speech on US campuses, I get confused. First of all, there seems to be big differences between public and private universities. I am not sure I understand those completely.

Private universities seem closest to the baker above. They may invite whomever they like (as long as no general laws are broken). But why they should is another matter. I don't understand why they should feel obliged to expose students to (more or less) controversial figures at all. These people can get up on the nearest soapbox and say whatever they want, but they have no right to demand the attention of students or anyone else. And students don't need their university to provide them with exposure to controversial ideas - they can seek those out at their leisure, if they feel the urge.

If universities wish to educate students about various differing (controversial) views on different topics, then they can do so by letting their own academic staff talk about such figures and topics.

If universities wish for students to sample the real thing, they can show video clips, instead of inviting people. That way they can control and balance exposure, and avoid security problems.

Now, a private university can behave much like a baker-cum-prick: They can throw balance out the window and decide to brainwash their students any way they see fit. Its a free market: universities provide whichever education they want, and students choose whichever education they want.

A public university, I would imagine, must not only abide by general laws, but also fulfill a national contract (perhaps in practice private universities do too, but that isn't self-evident) as laid out in federal (or state) curricula etc.

I would like to hope that such curricula, as much as possible, explicitly minimize ideological biases and emphasize core academic content and principles.

Public universities, like private ones, neither need nor should provide a platform for outside speakers - controversial or not. (See above.) They might, however, be obliged to inform students about as many differing viewpoints as possible, on different topics. Students are then free to search ot and explore as many of these as they see fit, in their own time.

In discussions on this, by American commentators, I often get the impression that universities are obliged to provide a platform for anyone who requests it. Can this really be the case? Or is it that many commentators simply express their opinion that universities should do so?

I don't think this is reasonable. Regardless, I don't see how this can be treated as a question of free speech. Anyone is entitled to exercise there right to free speech (limited by national regulations; these also seem more clearly delineated and uncontroversial in Sweden than in the US). But that doesn't mean that anyone is obliged to listen.

Pinker is dangerous

Steven Pinker is touring the world right now, promoting his new book, Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress. I watched his talk at FFRF (Freedom From Religion Foundation) recently*, and I also watched his keynote speech (embedded at the end of this post) at the European Parliament's Science and Technology Options Assessment, STOA, the other day, titled Should We Fear the Future?, followed by a debate with, among others, Thomas Metzinger and my good friend Olle Häggström (who, by the way, currently heads a research program on existential risk at Chalmers, Gothenburg, including several prominent guest researchers).

As many of my friends, I have long held conflicting feelings about Pinker. He has obviously written a lot of really good stuff, and he is one of the world's most eloquent and ardent proponents of enlightenment values, rationalism and humanism. But he is also, and increasingly so, a right-of center liberal. And he is neither a natural scientist nor an environmentalist.

It is probably uncontroversial to describe Pinker as an optimist, and a techno-optimist at that. He does  so himself, when he ironically reports his critics calling him, among other things, a Pollyanna and a Pangloss. Somewhat more controversial, perhaps, is branding him a libertarian utopian; a market-fundamentalist; a laissez-faire ideologue; or an elitist neoconservative. But I think the case can be made that those are apt epithets.

But my biggest fear about Pinker is that he - somewhat surprisingly, given his proven intellectual rigor - seems to suffer from a bad case of ideological blindness and wishful thinking, and that he seems completely uninterested in or worried about physical reality, thermodynamics, planetary boundaries, and inequality, among other things.

Pinker made quite a stir two years ago when, in the wake of CRISPR-Cas9,  he famously exhorted bioethicists to "get out of the way". Already in 2011, his influential book, The Better Angels of Our Nature, intensified the age-old debate on whether the glass is half-full or half-empty - a debate brilliantly surveyed by Oliver Burkeman in his piece for the Guardian from August this year, Is the world really better than ever?

In some respects, Pinker reminds me of the late Swedish physician, statistician and public educator Hans Rosling. Rosling has made a great impact - mostly positive - when it comes to presenting, and contributing to, a more nuanced view of the state of the world, not least in so called developing countries. But Rosling always struck me as working backwards from a utopian future; extrapolating his curves onto eventually (potentially) benign end states. Still, compared to Rosling, Pinker does not exhibit any statistical sophistication whatsoever.

Pinker also reminds me of Immanuel Kant, as he comes across in Jonathan Israel's A Revolution of the Mind: Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern Democracy. Despite revolutionary insights, he moulded his message so as not to upset the status quo; deferring, in the end, to the aristocratic powers-that-be. In the words of Israel:

Either history is infused by divine providence or it is not

Pinker's forthcoming book, except for a rousing introduction, seems to be a direct follow-up to "Better Angels" - except this time all graphs point (steeply) upwards. I can't help but think of a talk Sverker Sörlin gave to my students last week on his latest book, Antropocen (Anthropocene). Sörlin showed many of the same graphs that Pinker uses (and that Rosling used to do). But, critically, Sörlin also showed several other graphs that, although they also point upwards, paint a very different picture of the state and direction of the world. Many of these graphs are inspired by the work of Johan Rockström and his colleagues at the Stockholm Resilience Center.

Conspicuously absent from Pinker's narrative are any graphs that plot negative developments. One might argue that there is nothing wrong in making a case as strong as possible. But there certainly is, in this case, since the continued rise in Pinker's preferred graphs hinges, among other things, upon just those kinds of negative "externalities".

To my mind, it is morally suspect to present such a one-sided argument when the stakes are so high. Furthermore, in his talk, Pinker explicitly denies, or minimizes, several very tangible negative trends, such as the rise of inequality. As an aside, when discussing inequality, Pinker first erroneously states that happiness is (unproblematically) correlated with income, and then contradicts his own view by claiming that inequality is unimportant as long as the least well-off have access to a minimum level of material resources.

No self-respecting public intellectual could pass by the opportunity to lament the impending climate and environmental catastrophe. Pinker begins and ends his talk with a cursory nod to these problems, and to the risk of nuclear war, so as to frame his account of progress with a measure of balance and responsibility. But the overall effect is the opposite: One comes away from his exposition with the feeling that these problems are mere wrinkles on the path to glory. Progress is not inevitable, says Pinker, but the obstacles to continued growth and prosperity are not physical or mathematical. The only thing standing in the way is backwardness. Not just superstition, lack of education, religion etc., but caution itself, and any concept of science, democracy, liberty and collective well-being other than the one Pinker himself subscribes to. So get out of the way!

As a further illustration of Pinker's callous disregard for other and wider perspectives, and even of consistency - when it obstructs his agenda - is his sweeping denigration of researchers (and others) who raise concerns about artificial intelligence (AI) specifically, and about technological developments in general. I find it very revealing that his arguments are exactly isomorphous to those of so called "climate deniers" (and even to creationist deniers of evolution) - if you strip away the rhetorical flourishes, and the insidious references to modern (economical) behavioral science.

This is how Pinker dismisses - and accuses - anyone who raises concerns about the development of AI and other technologies (scientists as well as others), under the disingenuous and highly sententious heading "Why do intellectuals and journalists deny progress?" (30-35 minutes into the stream). Watch and judge for yourself.

1. Availability bias and publication bias


2. Negativity bias and (evolutionary) asymmetry between errors of type I and type II


3. "Gravitas" and supposed seriousness


4. Competition for status and money (grants), and (conscious) undermining of other institutions' prestige and influence


5. Fatalism and cynicism

(Neo-Luddites, romanticism and "cabin-porn" come to mind.)

The debate rages on. Pinker's latest contribution constitutes a particularly strong (and tangy) swell to one side. Considering the currents, I think it is dangerously one-sided.

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For context, read The Long Ecological Revolution.

For more context, read Trump Team to Promote Fossil Fuels and Nuclear Power at Bonn Climate Talks

And then some Meditations on Moloch.

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One of the more thoughtful and balanced thinkers on progress, and an extremely important voice today, is Kate Raworth. I highly recommend her initiative, Doughnut Economics.

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* Pinker's hour-long talk at FFRF has subsequently been removed from their Youtube channel, and replaced with a short introduction.